Essays on Mobility and Internal Labor Markets by Marisa Fernanda Figueiredo Tavares
ESSAYS ON MOBILITY AND INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS
Marisa Fernanda Figueiredo Tavares
TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO EM ECONOMIA
Orientada por:
Professora Doutora Anabela Carneiro
Professor Doutor José Varejão
Porto, 2012
.
Biographical Note
Marisa Fernanda Figueiredo Tavares was born on 24 January, 1979, in Porto, Por-
tugal.
In 2002 she concluded her rst degree in Economics (licenciatura) at Faculty of
Economics of the University of Porto (FEP) with an overall mark of 17 out of 20. She
was awarded with the Merit Scholarship from the University of Porto in 2001, the prize
Eng.o António de Almeida o¤ered by the Eng. António de Almeida Foundation and
the prize Bank of Portugal granted for obtaining the highest grade point average in
Economics.
She performed a brief internship at PriceWaterHouseCoopers before being admitted
as an Assistant Teacher at the Portuguese Catholic University, Faculty of Business
Management and Economics, where she remains until today.
In October 2003 she was admitted to the PhD program in Economics, at the Faculty
of Economics of the University of Porto (FEP). She concluded the curricular part of the
program with an overall mark of 18 out of 20. She presented articles in international
scientic meetings: NIPE Workshop 2009 - Economic Analysis Using Linked Employer
and Employee Data with David Card, Braga, ZEW/IAB Workshop on "Spatial Dimen-
sions of Labor Markets", Mannheim, 2009 and the 5th Portuguese Economic Journal
annual meeting, Aveiro, 2011.
iii
Acknowledgement
Writing a doctoral thesis is a demanding and challenging journey and there are many
people to whom I owe my eternal gratitude. To all of them, thank you!
A very special thanks to my supervisors, Anabela Carneiro and José Varejão, for
their guidance, reassurance and friendship over these years.
I thank to all the people that supported and helped me at Catholic University and
without whom this thesis wouldnt have been possible.
I thank the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) for their nancial support
through a PhD scholarship with reference SFRH / BD / 18156 / 2004. Im grateful to
Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP) for providing the data for this research
Finally, I want to thank all my Friends and Family for always being there for me.
An endless "thank you" to my Mother and to my Father for helping me become the
person I am today and to my husband, Manuel for taking this journey along with me.
I thank my children, Diogo and Inês (yet to be born) for being who they are!
Above all, I thank for the greatest, most beautiful and sole source of Love that
always looks after us, no matter how demanding and challenging the journey may seem
in our eyes...
iv
Abstract
This work discusses the importance of workers mobility to workers and rms and is
organized in two independent parts.
The rst essay explores workersmobility within and across regions and within and
across employers, emphasizing the importance of space for intra-rm mobility in multi-
establishment rms that have units in di¤erent locations. Our results seem to suggest
that mobility across establishments within the same employer is a channel to improve
wage growth opportunities. This is consistent with our hypothesis that in multi-plant
rms the internal labor market is based on the rm as a whole. We also suggest a new
strategy to estimate returns to migration by looking at the wage premiums of workers
that migrated without changing employer. We conclude that there exists a larger wage
premium when employees have to incur in additional costs such as those involved in
migration and that premiums for transfers to recently opened and to non-urban regions
are higher.
In the second essay we analyze the recruitment policies and the survival of newly cre-
ated establishments that are a¢ liated with pre-established rms. We suggest a channel
for knowledge transfer that has not been addressed in previous literature: within-rm
and across establishments mobility. As rm-specic knowledge is mainly embodied and
non tradable we suggest that it can be successfully transferred from the parent rm to
the new unit embodied in the group of employees that are internally hired. We nd
that internally transferred workers, particularly skilled workers play an important role
in improving the survival of newly created establishments.
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Resumo
Esta dissertação discute a importância da mobilidade dos trabalhadores para os
próprios trabalhadores e também para as empresas onde estes trabalham e está orga-
nizada em duas partes independentes.
O primeiro capítulo analisa a mobilidade dos trabalhadores sob várias vertentes: mo-
bilidade dentro da mesma empresa e entre empresas e também dentro da mesma região
e entre regiões. O nosso objectivo é enfatizar a importância do espaço na mobilidade
interna em empresas multi-estabelecimento que detêm liais em diferentes localizações
geográcas. Os resultados obtidos parecem sugerir que a mobilidade entre estabeleci-
mentos da mesma empresa é um canal para melhorar as oportunidades de crescimento
salarial dos trabalhadores. Este resultado é consistente com a nossa hipótese de que,
em empresas multi-estabelecimento, o mercado interno de trabalho é organizado tendo
em conta toda a empresa e não apenas um estabelecimento. Sugerimos também uma
nova estratégia para estimar os retornos à migração comparando o prémio salarial dos
trabalhadores que são transferidos internamente e migram face aos que apenas são
transferidos localmente. Concluímos que existe um prémio adicional quando os trabal-
hadores têm de suportar os custos associados à migração e também que os prémios por
transferências para novos estabelecimentos e para zonas rurais são mais elevados.
No segundo capítulo analisamos a política de recrutamento e a sobrevivência de novos
estabelecimentos criados por empresas pré-estabelecidas no mercado. Neste contexto,
sugerimos um canal de transferência de conhecimento para o novo estabelecimento
que não foi abordado previamente na literatura existente: a transferência interna de
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trabalhadores para o novo estabelecimento. Como o capital-humano especíco existe
incorporado nos trabalhadores sendo, por isso, dicilmente transaccionável, sugerimos
que este pode ser transferido com sucesso da empresa-mãe para o novo estabelecimento
através da transferência interna de trabalhadores. Concluímos que o grupo de tra-
balhadores contratados internamente, particularmente no caso dos trabalhadores mais
qualicados, desempenha um papel positivo importante na sobrevivência dos novos
estabelecimentos.
vii
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Introduction
This dissertation discusses the importance of workers mobility to workers and rms
and is organized in two independent parts.
The rst essay explores workersmobility within and across regions and within and
across employers. The main contribution of this chapter emerges from combining the
rm and the spatial dimensions of mobility revealing the spatial dimension of internal
labor markets. We emphasize the relevance of space for intra-rm mobility in multi-
plant rms that have establishments in di¤erent locations. Our results seem to suggest
that mobility across establishments within the same employer is a channel to improve
wage growth opportunities. This is consistent with our hypothesis that in multi-plant
rms the internal labor market is based and organized on the rm as a whole. Besides
analyzing the determinants and the returns to di¤erent types of mobility we also suggest
a new strategy to estimate returns to migration by looking at the wage premiums of
workers that migrated without changing employer. Moreover, the longitudinal dimen-
sion of our survey also allow us to distinguish between immediate and lagged gains to
mobility. We conclude that there exists a larger wage premium when employees have to
incur in additional costs such as those involved in migration. However, we also nd that
individual and rm specic characteristics are extremely relevant for mobility decisions
and that taking into account individual and rm unobserved heterogeneity consider-
ably decreases the value of the premiums. We also nd that premiums for transfers to
recently opened establishments are higher and that to encourage intra-rm migration
to non-urban regions, rms have to pay a considerably higher premium.
In our second essay we analyze the recruitment policies and the survival of newly
created establishments that are a¢ liated with pre-established rms. For the new units,
the existence of ports of entry as well as the importance of internal and external hires
is assessed. Being a¢ liated with a pre-established rm may be a source of competitive
advantage and improve the new establishments chances of survival as the parent rm
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may supply the newly created unit with expertise and rm-specic knowledge. In this
chapter we suggest a channel for knowledge transfer that has not been addressed in
previous literature: within-rm and across establishments mobility. As rm-specic
knowledge is mainly embodied and non tradable we suggest that it can be successfully
transferred from the parent rm to the new unit embodied in the group of employees
that are internally hired. We nd that internally transferred workers, particularly
skilled workers hired at high-rank jobs play an important role in improving the survival
of newly created establishments.
Both essays have an empirical nature and the data that we use was obtained from
Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a matched employer-employee administrative record collected
by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor. The dataset has a longitudinal dimension, which
allows us to track rms, establishments and workers over time and to match workers
with their rms and establishments.
2
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1 The Spatial Dimension of Internal Labor Markets
* The authors thank Mónica Costa Dias for extremely helpful comments and sugges-
tions. Comments from Gábor Kátay and other participants in the NIPE 2009 workshop,
comments from Nils Braakmann and other participants in the ZEW/IAB workshop on
"Spatial Dimensions of Labor Markets" at Mannheim (November, 2009) and comments
from participants at the 5th PEJ annual meeting (Aveiro, 2011) are gratefully acknowl-
edge. We are grateful to Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP) for providing
the data for this research.
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1.1 Introduction
Understanding factors that inuence mobility is relevant for both organizations and
individuals (Ostro¤ and Clark, 2001). From the rmsperspective, mobility will be an
essential tool to internally achieve an e¢ cient allocation of resources. From the workers
point of view, mobility may enhance wage perspectives in that rm or in another rm
and it may be seen as an investment in human capital. Moreover, mobility also enhances
labor market e¢ ciency and promotes matching between individuals and rms.
Mobility is a broad concept and several dimensions may be considered. The nov-
elty in our work results from combining the rm and the spatial dimension of mobil-
ity. Looking at the rm dimension we may distinguish movements between rms from
movements inside the rm. The former type of movement implies mobility between
the internal and the external labor market, while the latter is performed inside the
internal labor market of the rm (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). But mobility also has a
spatial dimension as it may require geographical moves. These moves may be local if
the worker is moving to a nearby location or they may imply a migration that involves
a region change. Compared with local moves migration decisions carry higher mobility
costs that may be monetary (travel costs, lodging costs,...) or psychological (separa-
tion from family, getting familiar with a new environment,...). By bringing together
these rm and spatial dimensions of mobility we will identify and distinguish between
di¤erent types of moves and subsequently focus on the determinants and returns for
intra-rm mobility that implies a geographical move. The analysis of the spatial di-
mension of internal labor markets is new, as previous works in this eld tended to focus
on movements within the same establishment ignoring the geographical dimension of
intra-rm mobility. By introducing space we reveal the spatial dimension of internal
labor markets that is relevant in multi-plant rms that own establishments in di¤erent
locations. In these rms, workers may move to another establishment of the same rm
experiencing a relocation of their workplace without changing employer. This transfer
will be local, if the new establishment is close to the one where the individual previously
worked but it will involve a migration if the change is performed to an establishment
located in a di¤erent region. A tangible reward is expected to exist when employees
4
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have to incur in additional costs such as those involved in migration1. Bearing in mind
this importance of space within the context of internal labor markets, we will analyze
the determinants and returns to mobility and propose a new strategy to isolate the re-
turns for geographical mobility estimating returns to migration by looking at the wage
premiums of workers that migrated without changing employer. Moreover, we will also
be able to distinguish between the immediate and the future gains to mobility.
Analyzing internal mobility brings up the concept of internal labor markets and the
seminal work of Doeringer and Piore (1971). Within internal labor markets pricing
and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures, dis-
tinguishable from the rules of the external labor market where pricing, allocation and
training decisions are inuenced directly by economic variables. The creation of inter-
nal labor markets may be a response to the existence of specic human capital (Becker,
1962), to the presence of mobility costs or matching e¤ects (Jovanovic, 1979) or it may
draw from the rms incentive strategies (Lazear, 1979). Internal labor markets liter-
ature explores the existence of an internal job ladder and extensive previous literature
focus on promotion dynamics and returns to promotion inside the same establishment
(McCue, 1996; Pergamit and Veum, 1999; Lima and Centeno, 2003; Lima, 2004; Lima
and Pereira, 2003; Hegedus & Hartman, 1992; Lazear and Oyer, 2004; Silva and Klaauw,
2006)2. Our outlook on internal mobility includes the spatial dimension implied by an
establishment change but, although with distinct features, these transfers may also be
a way to move within the internal labor market of multi-establishment rms. Indeed,
in these rms, the internal labor market may not be restricted to one particular estab-
lishment. When multi-plant rms decide to ll a vacancy through internal reallocation
they may transfer an employee that works at that particular location or they may also
transfer someone that works in a subsidiary of the same rm but in another location.
Our hypothesis is that in multi-plant rms the organization of the internal labor market
will be based on the rm as a whole, including all the establishments a¢ liated with that
rm. Internal transfers can be promotions or reassignments, they can occur as a reward
1Several works report the search for better wages as one of the main forces driving migration (Shaw, 1991; Farber,
1983; Yankow, 2003).
2McCue (1996) and Pergamit and Veum (1999) use individual panel data while Lazear and Oyer (2004), Lima (2004)
and Lima and Centeno (2003) explore the potential of matched employer-employee datasets.
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for great work, to test potential for more senior positions, or because the worker is the
best or most readily available candidate to ll an immediate need. Nevertheless, these
moves will be an important device in guarantying an e¢ cient allocation of resources
inside the rm and may improve the workers wage perspectives. For these transferred
employees that, although remaining with the same employer, have to change job loca-
tion, the spatial dimension of mobility is crucial because the transfer is accompanied
by a geographical move. We can nd only a few studies reporting results for this group
of internal movers (Bartel, 1979; Hunt, 2004), however, as these works are grounded in
migration literature they focus on workers that migrated without changing employer
but dont analyze local internal transfers. Bartels (1979) work refers the importance
of jointly analyzing migration decisions, turnover and job mobility. She identies three
types of migrations: quits, layo¤s and transfers and, this last group, includes the inter-
nally transferred workers that migrated without changing employer. She concludes that
the di¤erent groups identied have di¤erent characteristics and that the determinants
and returns to migration di¤er from one kind of mobility to the other. Using German
data from 1984 to 2000, Hunt (2004) estimates migration probabilities for the group of
non-local internal transfers restricting her analysis to inter-state movers. As the inter-
nal transfer goes hand in hand with the decision to migrate Hunt calls these workers
"same employer migrants". Her work was a step forward in migration literature as
Hunts paper opens doors to the link between intra-rm mobility and migration while
most of the previous literature focused primarily on the link between migration and
employer changes (Schae¤er, 1985; Shaw, 1991; Krieg and Bohara, 1999).
Depending on the type of mobility considered, several issues arise while estimat-
ing returns. One strategy to estimate returns to migration compares the outcomes
of movers that change employer with stayers in the same employer. The problem is
that while mobile workers improve their wages through job change, at the same time,
immobile workers experience wage gains as a result of specic training (Antel, 1986).
Our approach to estimate the returns to migration develops on Yankows (2003) work
that compares the outcomes of individuals who change employer and migrate against
the outcomes of those individuals changing employer within their current labor market.
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Yankows objective is to determine whether the returns to job change involving migra-
tion di¤er in important ways from local job changes. Our approach also allow us to
compare local and non-local changes but will di¤er from Yankows approach as we will
compare individuals that perform these changes within the same employer. Compar-
ing returns across job changers, as in Yankow (2003), may include greater uncertainty
and several variables that a¤ect returns may be di¢ cult to control. We believe that
comparing individuals that remain with the same employer while looking at the spa-
tial dimension of internal labor markets will allow us to better isolate the additional
premium for migration.
As intra-rm mobility may be driven by very di¤erent motivations we also examine
the wage premiums for moves to new and to pre-existing establishments trying to assess
if the possibly higher responsibility associated with a transfer to a recently opened
establishment gives rise to a higher wage premium. On the other hand, di¤erent regions
have di¤erent amenities (or disamenities) and, some destinations may be seen as more
(or less) attractive. Exploring these regional di¤erences we will also analyze how the
returns for migration di¤er for moves to urban and to non-urban areas.
The paper will be organized as follows: section 1.2 describes the data and details
the sample construction; sections 1.3 and 1.4 present the models and discuss the results
for mobility propensities and returns, respectively; section 1.5 concludes and points out
future research directions.
1.2 The Data
1.2.1 Description
The dataset used in this work was constructed using Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a
matched employer-employee administrative record. QP is an annual mandatory em-
ployment questionnaire collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor that all rms
with wage earners are legally obliged to ll in. The data include establishment-specic
details (employment, location, economic activity), information on the rm with which
the establishment is a¢ liated (location, economic activity, number of establishments,
employment, sales, ownership, legal framework), and workforce characteristics (gender,
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age, education, occupation, tenure, earnings, hours of work). Data are collected once
per year in October.
Firms, establishments and workers entering the database are assigned a unique iden-
tifying number and the Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a unit that
has previously reported to the database is not assigned a di¤erent identication number.
The dataset has a longitudinal dimension, which allows us to track rms/establishments
and workers over time and to match workers with their rms and establishments.
Although the dataset goes back to 1985, given that some variables that are relevant
for our work are only available after 1999, in this chapter, we use the 1999 to 2005 waves
of Quadros de Pessoal. For the year 2001, however, the only information available is
on rmsand establishmentscharacteristics as data on workers is not available. As
we will detail bellow this missing data poses some restrictions in the identication of
workersmobility.
1.2.2 Sample Design, Treatment Groups and Control Group
Our sample includes workers that appear in the QP dataset both in the years 1999 and
2000. In the year 2000 we identify the workers rst type of mobility and, then, we
follow these workers until 2005. We kept all workers aging between 15 and 65, classied
as wage earners and we excluded individuals with a wage equal to zero3. In order to
clearly identify and classify the workersmobility we dropped individuals working for
more than one employer4.
Workers can be employed in rms with only one establishment or in rms with more
than one establishment. Table 1.1 details information on the number of single and
multi-establishment rms in each year and also on the average number of workers by
rm type.
As small and medium sized rms prevail in Portuguese economy, the predominance
of single-establishment rms is expected. Across the years we observe that approx-
imately 10% of the rms are multi-plant rms. The average multi-plant rm has 4
3We performed consistency checks on the panel data. If we found an inconsistency in the variables gender, age or
tenure this was repaired, if possible or, otherwise, the worker was dropped from the data.
4 Individuals working for more than one employer are less than 1% of the population.
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Firm Type Variable 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Single-plant Number of rms 143543 145331 120480 114805 112065 116800
Average number workers 10 10 12 12 12 13
Multi-plant Number of rms 12156 12955 12333 12634 12739 13704
Average number workers 68 67 69 68 70 70
Total number of rms 155699 158286 132813 127439 124804 130504
Table 1.1: Single-establishment and multi-establishment rms: 1999-2005
establishments and, on average, they have approximately six to seven times more work-
ers than single-establishment rms. In our nal sample, we only kept individuals that
were employed in multi-establishment rms in the year prior to mobility. We imple-
mented this restriction in order to ensure that all the analyzed workers face the same
set of mobility choices. Clearly, it would be impossible for an individual working in
a single-establishment rm to perform an intra-rm mobility involving an establish-
ment change. We also removed from the sample all moves that were caused by the
closure of the establishment where the worker previously worked5 because, under this
circumstances, the worker is forced to move not being possible to remain in the same
establishment. Once again, for these workers the set of mobility choices is restricted as
the worker cannot choose not to move6.
Combining the rm and spatial dimensions of mobility we identied four di¤erent
types of moves:
1. Workers that remain with the same employer but are transferred to another es-
tablishment of the same rm in the same region;
2. Workers that remain with the same employer but are transferred to another es-
tablishment of the same rm in another region;
3. Workers that move to another employer in the same region;
4. Workers that move to another employer in a di¤erent region.
5We identify a closure in one year whenever information for the establishment is absent for that year and for all
subsequent years, i.e., if the establishment is not present in any of the subsequent waves of the data until 2009.
6Around one third of all same employer transfers are due to an establishment closure.
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These di¤erent types of mobility are depicted in Figure 1.1 and identied with the
numbers 1 to 4. For comparison, we also identify a fth type of individuals: workers
that dont move, remaining in the same establishment of the same rm (identied
as type 5 in Figure 1.1). Employer changes are identied when we observe a change
in the rms identication number while for same employer transfers we observe that
the identication number of the rm does not change, but there is a change in the
establishments identication number.
Region A
1
2
3
4
Region B
- Establishment of Firm X
- Establishment of Firm Y
- Establishment of Firm Z
5
Figure 1.1: Di¤erent mobility types
One issue should be claried before proceeding with the identication of the treat-
ment and control groups. As we previously referred, we do not have data on individuals
characteristics for the year 2001. This limitation poses some restrictions on the iden-
tication and classication of the workers mobility. For the year 2002, we can only
classify workers using the available information for 2000 and 2002 but we dont have in-
formation about the workers situation in 2001. For example, we may identify a worker
as an internal transfer to another establishment of the same rm in 2002 but, with the
information gap in 2001, we do not know if this internal transfer occurred in 2001 or in
2002. The same applies for the identication of employer changers in 2002.
Following directly from our previous classication of mobility, in Table 1.2 we identify
10
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the treatment groups and the control group. The four types of mobility give rise to the
four treatment groups, while the workers that remain in the same establishment of the
same rm will be used as a control group.
Multi-plant Move driven
Group Mobility Type Description rm before by plant
the move? closure?
Treatment SESR - Same Employer Same employer transfers without Yes No
Group 1 Same Region region change
Treatment SECR - Same Employer Same employer transfers with Yes No
Group 2 Change Region region change
Treatment CESR - Change Employer Employer change without Yes No
Group 3 Same Region region change
Treatment CECR - Change Employer Employer change with Yes No
Group 4 Change Region region change
Control NC - No change Employees that remain in the same Yes No
Group estab. of the same rm
Table 1.2: Identication of the treatment groups and control group
In order to analyze not only immediate gains but also lagged returns to mobility we
follow the workers until 2005. If, within the analyzed time period, the worker performs
another move, the new type of movement is identied and registered and the worker
continues to be followed after this new move. To explain our methodology we discuss
the hypothetical examples of two workers with di¤erent mobility paths. First, suppose
Worker A that is a SESR mover in year 0 and henceforth the worker remains in the
same establishment of the same rm. This worker will be identied as belonging to the
rst treatment group that includes workers that change establishment without changing
region and, as shown in Figure 1.2, will be followed until 4 years after the move.
W o rk er  A
Y ea r 0 Y ea r 1 Y ea r 2 Y ea r 3 Y ea r 4
SE SR 1 ye ar a fter  S ES R 2  ye ars a fte r S ES R 3  years a fte r S ES R 4  ye ars a fte r S ES R
Figure 1.2: Mobility path for Worker A
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Now lets suppose Worker B that is a SESR mover in year 0, but, unlike Worker
A, she performs a new type of mobility and is a CECR in year 3. As we can see
in Figure 1.3, this worker will be included in the rst treatment group (workers that
change establishment without changing region) and will be followed for two years in
that group and, then, will move to the fourth treatment group (workers that changed
employer and region) and will be followed for one year in that group.
W o rk er  B
Y ear 0 Y ea r 1 Y ea r 2 Y ea r 3 Y ea r 4
SE SR 1 year a fter  S ES R 2  years a fte r S ES R CE CR 1 yea r a fte r C ECR
Figure 1.3: Mobility path for Worker B
As the assignment of workers to the treatment groups requires the distinction be-
tween local and non-local moves we need to clarify the denition of region change7. In
our analysis we initially identied 21 regions:
 Foreign countries;
 The archipelagos Madeira and Açores;
 And the 18 Portuguese districts: Aveiro, Beja, Braga, Bragança, Castelo Branco,
Coimbra, Évora, Faro, Guarda, Leiria, Lisboa, Portalegre, Porto, Santarém, Setúbal,
Viana do Castelo, Viseu, Vila Real.
Then, we considered two possible denitions of region change. The rst considers
that a region change means that the worker is transferred to an establishment located
in a di¤erent Portuguese district or to an establishment located in Madeira, Açores or
abroad. However, given Portugals geographical dimension changing district might not
necessarily imply a migration or a residence change, therefore we also consider a second
and more demanding denition that will only identify a region change when the worker
changes to a non-contiguous district. Table 1.3 details the proportion of region changes
using both criteria.
7We notice that, in the QP dataset, we do not have information about the workers residence but only about the
workersworkplace.
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Type of region change District change Change to non-contiguous district
Same-employer transfers 19% 10%
Employer changes 16% 7%
Table 1.3: Proportion of region changes according to both denitions: 2000-2005
Considering our rst and less restrictive denition, 19% of same employer transfers
involve a region change while considering the second denition this proportion drops
to 10%. Within the group of workers that change employer we nd 16% and 7% of
region changes considering the rst and second denition of migration, respectively. As
expected, we have a lower proportion of migrations when we use the second denition
of region change. It is interesting to remark, however, that no matter the denition we
use, we observe a higher proportion of migrants in the group of same employer transfers.
Adopting the more conservative and cautious strategy, in the present paper, we use
the second and more demanding denition of region change. However, using the rst
denition of region change conclusions are quite similar and the results will be reported
in appendix.
Our nal sample includes 165743 workers that are locally transferred to another
establishment of the same rm and 18072 that migrate without changing employer. We
also identify 100278 individuals changing employer within the same region, while 8127
workers change employer and region. As can be seen in Table 1.4, our four treatment
groups include a total of 670611 observations. Table 1.5 characterizes the control group
that includes 324575 workers that remain in the same establishment and rm and that
are followed until 2005 in a total of 904467 observations.
1.2.3 Characterizing the Data
In Table 1.6 we briey characterize our treatment and control groups. Workers that
change employer tend to be younger than the control group. When the move implies
a region change women are less mobile than men and we nd that the proportion of
women in the group of internally transferred workers that change region is particularly
low (23,1%). Foreign workers tend to be more mobile than natives. As expected, tenure
is lowest for the group of employer changes but same employer transfers are also less
13
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Treatment Group
SESR SECR CESR CECR
Year of the move 165743 18072 100278 8127
1 year after 95637 6440 81113 3721
2 year after 50451 2985 52202 1909
3 year after 27599 1622 31483 1080
4 year after 8751 584 12529 285
Total 348181 29703 277605 15122 670611
Table 1.4: Number of observations in the treatment groups: 2000-2005
Control Group
NC
2000 324575
2002 188027
2003 141877
2004 128021
2005 121967 Treatment Groups All
Totals 904467 670611 1575078
Table 1.5: Number of observations in the control group, treatment groups and all sample: 2000-2005
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tenured than the control group. We observe that same employer transfers show a higher
proportion of workers with higher education. Nevertheless, for same employer transfers
that change region we also observe a high proportion of individuals with 4 or less years
of schooling. Apparently, in the group of internally transferred workers we can nd very
high but also very low educated workers. Around 70% of these low educated individuals
work in the construction sector while the highly educated internal transfers prevail in
nancial activities. Our sample of employer changers also shows a high proportion of
workers with more than 12 years of schooling.
In the QP dataset workers are assigned to eight hierarchical levels (these are dened
by law in Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, de 2 Junho8). Doing some aggregation, in this
chapter, we dene six levels:
 Top executives;
 Intermediary executives;
 Supervisors, team leaders and foremen;
 Highly-skilled and skilled professionals;
 Semi-skilled and non-skilled professionals;
 Apprentices, interns, trainees.
The proportion of top and intermediary executives in the group of same employer
transfers is slightly higher than in the control group. In the group of internal transfers we
also nd a high proportion of supervisors, team leaders and foremen, 66% of which work
in construction. Employer changes seem to be more frequent at the top and bottom
hierarchical levels. Considering the Portuguese Classication of Economic Activity
(cae)9 we notice that internal moves prevail in construction (cae F), in hotels and
restaurants (cae H) and in nancial activities (cae J), while employer changes also
predominate in construction (cae F) and in real estate, renting and business activities
(cae K). Internal labor markets are more likely to be relevant in large rms, so it is
not surprising that same employer transfers prevail in these rms. We also see that the
8See Appendix A.
9Equivalent to Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) codes. See Appendix B.
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group of individuals that migrate within the same employer face a lower concentration
of establishment a¢ liated to the parent rm in the region where they previously worked
and thus faced a smaller set of choices for local internal transfers.
Table 1.7 details information on the real hourly earnings (in logs)10 for the four
treatment groups and the control group. Same employer transfers earn more than the
control group and we observe the highest wages for the group of individuals internally
transferred that migrate. Comparing with the control group, workers that change
employer in our sample face a deep in earnings in the year of the move but this loss is
recovered in the following years.
Internal transfers may be linked with the opening of new establishments11. In multi-
plant rms the new vacancies created by the opening may be lled by hiring in the
internal labor market or by external hires. In our sample, we observe that around one
fourth of all same employer transfers were made to new establishments12.
Same employer transfers may also be associated with promotion events (Bartel,
1979). Considering the information in our dataset, we have at least two ways to empir-
ically identify a promotion. We may use the information reported by employers as the
date of the last promotion or we may associate promotions with a change to a higher
hierarchical level. Using the date of the last promotion reported by the employer, we
found that around 20% of all same employer transfers were associated with a promotion
event in the year of the transfer. Considering changes in hierarchical levels, we found
that around 8% of internal transfers implied a change to a higher hierarchical level.
The same worker may change establishment within the same employer more than
once. We observe that some of this repeated internal moves are return movers, which
means that the worker returns to an establishment in which he has previously worked,
showing that internal transfers can be merely temporary. Approximately one fourth of
all internal transfers are return moves.
10Hourly earnings are dened as the ratio between total regular and irregular labour earnings and the total number
of normal hours worked.
11The topic of internal transfers to newly-created establishments is further developed in the second chapter of this
dissertation.
12We identify an opening whenever information for that establishment is reported to QP for the rst time in the
corresponding spell, i.e., if the establishment is not present in any of the preceding waves of the data (since 1985).
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Variable SESR SECR CESR CECR NC All
Age (years) 40.3 40.6 36.1 35.9 41.4 40.8
Gender (proportion of female) 39.2% 23.1% 41.8% 33.7% 41.2% 40.2%
Tenure (months) 148.1 141.2 48.6 25.2 170.6 154.2
4 or less years of schooling 25.8% 32.8% 20.8% 21.4% 28.5% 26.3%
Education 6 or 9 years of schooling 35.8% 33.5% 37.7% 35.7% 39.0% 38.4%
12 years of schooling 24.7% 20.1% 25.4% 22.3% 21.8% 23.0%
More than 12 years 12.8% 12.7% 14.3% 18.1% 10.2% 11.6%
Top executives 7.1% 7.7% 8.6% 10.6% 6.4% 7.2%
Hierarchical Intermediary executives 7.4% 7.8% 5.1% 5.5% 5.6% 6.0%
level Supervisors, team leaders, foremen 8.3% 15.9% 3.9% 5.6% 6.4% 6.6%
High-skilled, skilled professionals 53.5% 55.1% 47.1% 46.5% 53.3% 53.4%
Semi-skilled, non-skilled professionals 19.6% 10.9% 26.4% 23.0% 24.7% 22.9%
Apprentices, interns, trainees 1.3% 0.7% 4.7% 2.9% 1.3% 1.5%
A/B 0.5% 0.3% 1.0% 3.0% 1.0% 0.9%
C 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 1.0% 0.7%
D 11.7% 7.3% 0.4% 12.3% 27.8% 23.0%
E 2.6% 1.0% 0.5% 1.5% 1.4% 2.4%
F 11.9% 41% 6.2% 16.0% 3.9% 5.9%
G 20.1% 18.9% 24.9% 19.8% 21.8% 21.5%
H 6.1% 1.5% 6.0% 4.4% 3.2% 3.9%
CAE I 14.9% 10.9% 10.0% 7.1% 15.1% 14.9%
J 17.1% 7.7% 6.2% 3.4% 8.6% 10.0%
K 6.3% 6.3% 22.4% 27.4% 5.9% 7.7%
L 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
M 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 0.7% 1.4% 1.3%
N 4.4% 1.2% 2.1% 1.7% 5.2% 4.5%
O 2.8% 2.4% 3.5% 2.0% 3.3% 3.2%
P - - - - - -
Q - - - - - -
Foreign workers 1.3% 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 0.7% 0.9%
Firm size (log number of workers) 6.47 6.81 5.96 5.84 5.99 6.08
Concentration of estab. (before the move) 46.5% 23.3% 47.0% 43.5% 49.0% 48.8%
Table 1.6: Workers and rmscharacteristics: 2000-2005
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N SESR N SECR N CESR N CECR N NC
Year of the move 162761 1.92 17835 2.05 98343 1.73 7935 1.77 324489 1.80
1 year after 93445 1.93 6320 2.15 79064 1.93 3627 1.91 182796 1.87
2 year after 49269 1.93 2933 2.22 51064 1.98 1857 2.01 138405 1.87
3 year after 26949 1.95 1598 2.23 30854 1.97 1057 2.05 124794 1.88
4 year after 8543 1.91 577 2.20 12337 2.11 279 2.08 118789 1.86
Total 340967 29263 271662 14755 889273 1545920
Table 1.7: Evolution of real hourly earnings (in logs): 2000-2005
Being the two Portuguese main cities, the districts of Lisboa and Porto are expected
to be important attraction poles. To appraise the importance of these two regions as a
destination choice, in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 we identify the proportion of region changes
that were made to Lisboa and Porto. Globally, we conclude that around 50% of all
region changes have Porto or Lisboa as destinations.
Year Porto (%) Lisboa (%) Total (%)
2000 20% 28% 48%
2002 19% 34% 53%
2003 20% 36% 56%
2004 20% 29% 49%
2005 25% 29% 54%
Table 1.8: Region changes to Porto or Lisboa for same employer transfers: 2000-2005
Year Porto (%) Lisboa (%) Total (%)
2000 19% 31% 50%
2002 18% 27% 45%
2003 24% 27% 51%
2004 17% 33% 50%
2005 22% 29% 51%
Table 1.9: Region changes to Porto or Lisboa for employer changes: 2000-2005
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1.3 Intra-rm and Inter-rm Mobility: Who Moves?
1.3.1 Empirical Methodology: Discrete Choice Model
To characterize workers that are more prone to mobility and to analyze mobility prob-
abilities we use the multinomial logit model (MNL) (Schmidt and Strauss, 1975).
The model extends the logit model when the response has more than two outcomes.
Let y denote a random variable taking on the values f0; 1; :::; Jg for J a positive in-
teger, and let X denote a set of regressors. In our model y will denote the type of
mobility performed by the individual, while X will contain individual specic variables
and rm/establishment characteristics. The choice of the regressors is based on the
fact that demographic and other characteristics are believed to inuence the costs of
moving and therefore are related to the willingness to accept changes (Turban et al.,
1992). Education, for instance, is believed to have a positive impact on mobility as more
educated individuals seem to have lower costs of migration and tend to be in "occupa-
tions that operate in a national labor market" (Bartel, 1979). Industry, size and the
concentration of establishments of the same parent rm in the region are the variables
used to characterize rms. These factors are believed to inuence both intra-rm and
inter-rm mobility. To characterize the quality of the match we included dummies for
tenure and hierarchical level, hourly earnings and whether the worker was promoted in
the last three years before moving. Naturally, mobility is expected to be less likely in
a good job match. We are interested in how, ceteris paribus, changes in the elements
of X a¤ect the response probabilities, P (y = jjX) , j = 0; 1; 2; :::; J: Considering the
four mobility types identied, in our model J equals 4. Table 1.10 claries the relation
between the MNL ve categories and our classication of mobility.
Mobility type MNL category j
NC - No change 0
SESR - Same Employer Same Region 1
SECR - Same Employer Change Region 2
CESR - Change Employer Same Region 3
CECR - Change Employer Change Region 4
Table 1.10: MNL model categories
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Let X be a 1  K vector with rst-element unity, the MNL model has response
probabilities:
P (y = jjX) = exj
1+
JX
h=1
exh
where j is K  1 , j = 1; :::; J with J = 4
Because the response probabilities must sum to unity, P (y = 0jX) is determined
once we know the probabilities for j = 1; 2; :::; J :
P (y = 0jX) = 1
1+
JX
h=1
exh
The model implies that we can compute J odds-ratios:
Pj(x;)
Ph(x;)
= ex(j h) and if h = 0; Pj(x;)
P0(x;)
= exj
The estimation of the MNL model is best carried out by maximum likelihood (Mc-
Fadden, 1974).
1.3.2 Empirical Results
In Table 1.11 we report results for the MNL regression. In the estimation workers that
remain in the same establishment of the same rm were considered the basecategory.
The variables included in the MNL model are fully detailed and explained in Appendix
C.
Following estimation, we began by testing whether the di¤erent types of mobility
considered could be pooled together into common single status, i.e., we tested whether
the coe¢ cient estimates from the MNL model could be constrained to be the same.
In particular, we investigated whether we could pool together internal transfers and
employer changes not involving region change (mobility types SESR and CESR) and
internal transfers and employer changes involving migration (mobility types SECR and
CECR). Considering local changes we meant to test whether, at the eyes of the worker,
performing the move within the same employer is viewed as di¤erent from moves that
imply an employer change. Similarly, when considering mobilities that imply a region
change, we wanted to test whether the worker views migration with employer change
di¤erently from migrations within the same employer. Performing a Wald test under
the null hypothesis of equalizing regressors for mobility types SESR and CESR and
for mobility types SECR and CECR, the hypothesis of pooling together these types of
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Type 1 - SESR Type 2 - SECR Type 3 - CESR Type 4 - CECR
Indep. var. Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Tenure36_p 0.2714*** (23.41) 0.5865*** (19.06) 1.6512*** (105.46) 2.5360*** (44.72)
Tenure96_p 0.0501*** (5.19) 0.1743*** (6.37) 0.3479*** (24.31) 0.9803*** (17.53)
Age_p 0.0142*** (4.68) 0.0586*** (6.34) -0.0444*** (-12.31) 0.0092 (0.67)
Age squar_p -0.0269*** (-7.39) -0.0884*** (-7.97) -0.0343*** (7.68) -0.0302* (-1.72)
Female_p -0.0786*** (-9.74) -0.2744*** (-10.43) -0.1292*** (-11.66) -0.2231*** (-5.52)
Educ4_p 0.0223 (1.30) 0.2960*** (5.75) -0.1337*** (-5.46) -0.3516*** (-4.17)
Educ9_p -0.1126*** (-7.95) -0.1213*** (-2.73) -0.1529*** (-7.53) -0.4744*** (-6.70)
Educ12_p -0.0435*** (-3.34) -0.1986*** (-4.59) -0.0719*** (-3.82) -0.3948*** (-6.14)
Nationality 0.3309*** (8.63) 0.3626*** (4.15) 0.4099*** (9.56) 0.1380 (0.88)
Prom [-3,0] -0.0055 (-0.80) -0.1544*** (-7.92) -0.9711*** (-78.12) -1.2659*** (-29.41)
lnw_p -0.2179*** (-21.54) -0.0031*** (-3.11) -0.1565*** (-11.41) -0.2624*** (-5.17)
Size_p 0.1862*** (71.14) 0.0951*** (9.24) -0.0180*** (-5.33) -0.1218*** (-10.74)
Est.Conc._p 0.6158*** (44.45) -2.8241*** (-53.31) -0.2522*** (-12.76) -1.2733*** (-18.37)
Constant -3.2094*** (-46.04) -4.6011*** (-21.19) -0.9159*** (-11.17) -3.8059*** (-12.82)
Log pseudL. -630488.18
Prob>X2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1002
N 1164938
Notes: NC workers is the base outcome;
Specication also includes a set of time dummies, industry dummies and controls for hierarchical levels;
Cluster-robust t statistics in parentheses (cluster variable: id_worker);
***, **, * denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.11: MNL regression: 2000-2005
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mobility was statistically rejected, strengthening the hypothesis that these categories
should be analyzed separately.
In Table 1.12 we report the estimated average probabilities of choosing each type of
mobility13. We observe that workers are averse to mobility and that most moves dont
involve a change in region. Interestingly, we also conclude that same employer transfers
are an important and rather common event for the group of mobile workers. We notice
that around 64% of all local moves (SESR and CESR) are performed without changing
employer and if we consider the group of moves that imply a region change (SECR and
CECR) the proportion is even higher and we see that almost 77% of migrations are
made within the same employer.
Average Probabilities
NC - No Change 83.30%
SESR - Same Employer Same Region 10.75%
SECR - Same Employer Change Region 1.22%
CESR - Change Employer Same Region 4.42%
CECR - Change Employer Change Region 0.31%
Table 1.12: Average probabilities of choosing each mobility type, 2000-2005
Looking at Table 1.11 we see that women tend to be less mobile than men. Our
results show a negative relation between pre-move wages and the probability of mobility
both for employer changes and intra-rm mobility. For same employer transfers we nd
that lower pre-move wages increase the probability of being internally transferred which
may be consistent with our hypothesis that same employer transfers are a way to im-
prove future wage perspectives inside the rm. An employee that is being well rewarded
in the establishment where he presently works has less incentives to move elsewhere.
This hypothesis is also corroborated when we observe that having been promoted in
the three years before the move also decreases the likelihood of being transferred to
another establishment. These establishment transfers can be a di¤erent way to move
within the internal labor market and to build a career inside multi-establishment rms.
Apparently, our results show that these transferred individuals may be trying to climb
13These probabilities were computed as the average probabilities for all individuals in our sample.
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the internal job ladder. We recall that 20% of same employer transfers were associated
with a promotion event in the year of the transfer. This may signal that internal trans-
fers are an investment that may result in better wage and career perspectives inside the
rm. Bartel (1979) also conjectured that these transfers acted as a promotion within
the rm. Our results support the hypothesis that in multi-plant rms there exists a
global internal labor market which is built on the rm as a whole.
We also nd a negative relation between pre-move wages and the probability of
changing employer. Moreover, being promoted in the three previous years also has a
negative e¤ect on the probability of changing employer implying that promotion events
reduce the probability of a job separation. Although this may seem evident, it might
not be so because promotion also signals to the external market that the worker is
valuable (Waldman, 1984). However, as long as some human capital is rm specic
a promotion may signal that the worker is better suited to the current rm than to
other rms (Lazear, 1999, Jovanovic 1979). Summing up, for the case of workers that
are performing poorly at the rm, either by lower wages or by lower promotion rates,
we observe that they are more likely to leave the rm (voluntarily or involuntary). We
conclude that an unsuccessful track in the company increases the likelihood of changing
employer, probably indicating the termination of a bad job match.
Job changers tend to be younger and may be searching for a better match, however,
for the group of same employer changes, age seems to have a positive impact on the
probability of being transferred. Although human capital theory states that younger
workers tend to invest more in their careers and be more mobile, older workers can
have more labor market experience which may be relevant for same employer transfers.
This may be particularly relevant if the transfer is related to the opening of a new
establishment, where a more experienced worker may be important.
Education is believed to have a positive impact on mobility as more educated work-
ers tend to have lower mobility costs and adapt easily to changes. If the move involves
an employer change more instructed individuals tend to have better information about
job opportunities. On the other hand, if the move involves a migration, more educated
individuals are also believed to have lower costs of migration and tend to be in occu-
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pations that operate in a national labor market (Bartel, 1979). This last argument
may also be crucial within the context of internal labor markets in multi-establishment
rms. If educated workers are more likely to occupy jobs that operate in a national
labor market, when they work in a multi-establishment rm, they may move within the
rms "national" internal labor market for more skilled professionals. For the worker,
these transfers may constitute a less risky and less costly alternative to migrations in
the external labor market. As in Hunts (2004), our empirical results give substance to
the conclusion that skilled workers (...) have a low cost migration avenue that has not
been considered in previous literaturewhich is "same employer migration". Neverthe-
less, for the group of same employer transfers, we also observe a higher probability of
moving for workers with four or less years of schooling. Apparently, we are identifying
two di¤erent kinds of same employer movers: high-skilled workers to whom these trans-
fers may be seen as a way to enhance career perspectives and very low-skilled workers
to whom this mobility may be a "requirement" to remain with the employer they are
working for and a condition for keeping jobs in a particular industry. This hypoth-
esis is corroborated if we analyze the sectors where same employer transfers prevail.
We nd that establishment transfers prevail in construction (cae F) and in hotels and
restaurants (cae H) where we may nd a higher proportion of low skilled workers, but
they also prevail in nancial activities (cae J) where a higher proportion of high skilled
workers is present14.
As job tenure may be a proxy for the accumulation of specic human capital, the
rm might choose to transfer employees with higher tenure (Bartel ,1979). However,
for same employer transfers, we nd a positive signal for the group of less tenured
employees. This nding complements our discussion about the impact of previous
wages and previous promotions on the probability of being transferred. The transfer
is in itself an investment that lower tenured workers may use as a tool to improve
career perspectives. Apparently, we may conclude that transferred workers in multi-
establishment rms may be looking for ways to increase the accumulation rate of specic
human capital and improve career opportunities. We nd that the likelihood of changing
14Hunt (2004) also nds some dichotomies concluding that "same employer migrants" prevail in certain job categories
like cashiers for women and architects and engineers for men.
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employer decreases with tenure, which is also consistent with the specic human capital
theory. When there are important investments in specic human capital both the rm
and the worker have an interest in preserving and maintaining the job relation. As it is
reasonable to assume that rm specic capital increases with tenure, then, displacement
probability will be higher for low tenured employees, being possible to observe that new
jobs tend to end early (Farber, 1999).
We also notice that same employer transfers prevail in larger rms where internal
labor markets are more likely to exist and to play an important role. On the other hand,
workers in large rms are less likely to leave which is consistent with usual ndings that
large rms have lower turnover rates.
In the estimation we also included a variable measuring the proportion of establish-
ment that the parent rm owns in the region where the individual was working before
the move. We observe that the higher the concentration of establishments in the region
where the individual is working the higher the probability of performing a same em-
ployer transfer without changing region and the lower the probability of changing to an
establishment in another region. We also observe that the higher the concentration of
establishments in the region of origin the lower the probability of changing employer.
1.3.2.1 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives .
It is stated that the appropriateness of the multinomial logit model relies on the
property whereby Pj(x;)
P0(x;)
is independent of the remaining probabilities, known as the
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA). The IIA means that,
all else being equal, a persons choice between two alternative outcomes is una¤ected by
what other choices are available. This assumption is often illustrated by the commonly
used example "Red bus/Blue bus" from McFadden (1974) although Train (2003) points
out that this example is rather extreme and unlikely to occur in serious, substantive
research. Implementing a Hausman test and comparing the estimation of the full model
with a restricted model where we eliminate mobility type 3, CESR, we cannot reject
the hypotheses that IIA holds. For the other mobility types (SESR, SECR and CECR)
when performing the Hausman test to compare the full and the restricted models we
obtain negative test statistics. Under these circumstances, extensive literature sug-
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gests that we should also not reject the hypothesis that the IIA holds (Hausman and
McFadden,1984, Cheng and Long, 2007). However, when performing the Small-Hsiao
test (Small and Hsiao, 1985) we didnt get support for the IIA hypothesis. Long and
Freese (2001) alert to the fact that these tests often give inconsistent results and may
provide little guidance to violations of the IIA assumption. Fry and Harris (1996, 1998)
explored the statistical properties of these tests discussing their size and power proper-
ties. Some recent literature argues that there may be some problems with these tests
and Cheng and Long (2007) state that "even in well-specied models, IIA tests often
reject the assumption when the alternatives seem distinct". They conclude that tests
of the IIA assumption that are based on the estimation of a restricted choice set are
unsatisfactory for applied work.
Multinomial probit model (MNP) is often proposed as an alternative to the MNL
model as the error specication in MNP allow for correlations between the errors, po-
tentially removing the IIA assumption. However, MNP presents di¢ cult computational
problems and some authors argue that there exists little evidence showing that MNP
will provide more accurate results than MNL. Kropko (2008) conducts computer simu-
lations to show that MNL nearly always provides more accurate results than MNP, even
when the IIA assumption is severely violated. They suggest that researchers should not
assume that MNP is the most reliable empirical model. Dow and Endersby (2004)
suggest, as well, that, for most purposes, the simpler MNL is preferable to MNP15.
As suggested by Cheng and Long (2007), it appears that the best advice regard-
ing the IIA goes back to an early statement by McFadden (1974) who wrote that the
multinomial and conditional logit models should be used in cases where the outcome
categories can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighed independently in the
eyes of each decision maker" and that MNL works well when the alternatives are dis-
similar (Amemiya,1981)16.
15Although we nd in Stata the command "mprobit", it assumes that the errors are uncorrelated estimating an
exact counterpart to the MNL. Despite these facts, it is possible to nd papers using "mprobit" command to estimate
multinomial probit models and allegedly relaxing IIA (Jepsen, 2008 or Shi and Heerink, 2007).
16As an alternative to overcome the violation of the IIA hypothesis we explored the estimation of a mixed logit
model. Mixed logit is a highly exible model that can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train,
2000). We used the Stata module "mixlogit" (Train 2003; Hole 2007) to perform the estimation. Due to time and
computational reasons we estimated a very parsimonious regression but the results we obtained appeared to validate the
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1.4 Returns to Mobility: The E¤ect of Workers Mobility on Wages
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1.1 Model Specications .
Exploring the outcomes of mobility, we want to analyze the returns to mobility
identifying immediate and lagged returns to the di¤erent types of mobility identied:
1. SESR - Same Employer Same Region;
2. SECR - Same Employer Change Region;
3. CESR - Change Employer Same Region;
4. CECR - Change Employer Change Region.
To clarify our objective we start with a basic framework, based on the estimation
of a simple OLS equation capturing the di¤erence in earnings for the di¤erent types of
mobility:
lnWit = 1Xit+2Zit+
4X
k=0
SESRkitk+
4X
k=0
SECRkitkk+
4X
k=0
CESRkitk+
4X
k=0
CECRkit k+
t + "it
where lnWit is the logarithm of real hourly earnings for individual i at period t.
Hourly earnings are dened as the ratio between total regular and irregular labor earn-
ings and the total number of normal hours worked. We deliberately chose to include
irregular earnings because some pay di¤erentials for transferred employees may arise in
the form of irregular benets17. Wages were converted to constant 2005 euros, using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Xit is a vector of individual characteristics and Zit includes a set of rm character-
istics. The variable SESRkit is a dummy variable that takes the value one if at time t
worker i is k years after being transferred to another establishment of the same rm
in the same region. The k parameters reect the di¤erence in earnings k years after
changing establishment within the same region and the corresponding control group,
workers that dont change employer nor establishment (identied in previous sections
results obtained with the MNL model (see Appendix D).
17We also tested the specication using only regular labor earnings. The results were similar to the ones reported and
are presented in Appendix F.
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as NC). SECRkit is a dummy variable that takes the value one if at time t worker i
is k years after being transferred to another establishment of the same rm located in
a di¤erent region. The k parameters reect the di¤erence in earnings k years after
changing establishment and region and the control group.
Similarly, the variable CESRkit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
at time t worker i is k years after changing employer within the same region. The k
parameters reect the di¤erence in earnings k years after changing employer within the
same region and the NC group of workers that dont change employer nor establishment.
Finally, the variable CECRkit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at time
t worker i is k years after changing employer and region. The  k parameters reect
the di¤erence in earnings k years after changing employer and region and the control
group.
t is a set of time dummies that control for year-specic e¤ects and "it is a disturbance
term which is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance.
Using this framework, our mobility dummies capture the wage premiums for the
di¤erent types of mobility comparing with the control group, not only in the year of
the move but also in the following years. This allows us to analyze the lagged e¤ects
of mobility on wages distinguishing between the immediate gains to mobility and the
future gains to mobility and also to discriminate returns between the di¤erent types
of mobility considered. This framework also allows us to suggest a new approach to
estimate returns to migration. To estimate the wage growth that rewards migration we
consider the group of individuals that are transferred to another establishment of the
same employer identifying and comparing returns for local and non-local internal trans-
fers. This strategy is implemented by comparing wage premiums for individuals with
types SESR and SECR as the premium for mobility SESR will be linked to movements
in the internal job ladder while the additional wage growth for mobility type SECR,
when the transfer involves a region change, will be related with the migration premium.
1.4.1.2 Selectivity Problems .
Mobility decisions raise selectivity problems. When selectivity problems are ignored
we may get erroneous estimates of the parameters and biased estimation of returns.
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Maddala (1978) points out that empirical data is the result of economic agents making
choices and that this may lead to selectivity biases. The purpose of this section is to
discuss the implications of selectivity in our analysis of the wage returns to mobility,
particularly for the case of same employer movers.
The OLS estimation would only be appropriated if mobility could be seen as a
quasi-experiment and if we could believe that mobile workers are a random sample of
the population.
For same employer movers two types of selectivity biases may arise. First, the
employee must be o¤ered the opportunity to perform the transfer and this decision is
made by the employer. Then, the worker will decide to accept or not the proposal and
if the answer is positive we will observe that worker in our same employer treatment
groups.
Considering the rst kind of selectivity bias, the choice of which workers will receive
the proposal to perform the move is not random but decided by the employer. This
kind of selectivity is similar to the program administrator selectivity. For the case of
public programs the assignment to the "treatment group" and "control group" is not
random but dependent on the criterion decided by the program administrators. In
our model we have an employer selectivity as the employer will rstly have to decide
to which workers the proposal of internal transfer will be made. On the one hand,
this decision may depend on the rms strategy (for example, which establishments
will open vacancies for internal transfers and which will not). On the other hand, this
selection will also depend on the employers perception of which employees will be the
best suited for the open vacancy.
The second phase of the process consists on the workers decision to accept or decline
the employers proposal. Considering competing alternatives the employee will agree
or not to move to another establishment and this will generate a self-selection prob-
lem. The result is that workers selecting to perform the internal transfer tend to be
non-randomly distributed within the population as a whole18. In the presence of self-
18Self-selection has been addressed in several labour market settings such as female labour force participation (Heck-
man, 1974), migration decisions (Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; Borjas, 1987), training program participation (Ham and
LaLonde, 1996), choice of schooling (Willis and Rosen, 1979) and union versus nonunion employment (Lee, 1978).
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selection, the worker can decide to participate or not in the "treatment group". This
choice will be based on utility maximization where the utility is a function of expected
incremental returns but also of individual observed and unobserved characteristics (such
as risk aversion and other unobserved individual characteristics). The selection rule is
so that returns are observed only for the individuals utility maximizing choice because
the workers returns are not observed for all alternatives but only for the alternative
that he chooses. In the self-selected sample, the error term "it does not necessarily
have zero mean and OLS estimation of the returns potentially yields biased estimates
of the parameters. The bias arises as workers that perform a given mobility may behave
di¤erently from the rest because they have a comparative advantage for the mobility
type they have chosen. In fact, workers choosing a given alternative do so because they
have some tangible basis for perceiving a more favorable return for that alternative
than those who choose otherwise. The presence of self-selected moves causes the ob-
served returns to moves to di¤er from the returns we would expect a randomly chosen
individual to earn.
1.4.1.3 Fixed E¤ects Approach .
In this context, and because an instrumental variables approach was not feasible due
to the lack of valid instruments to identify the moments of interest, we use a xed-e¤ects
approach that accounts for unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity that is shared among
groups of observations19. The decision to move may be strongly inuenced by individual
specic e¤ects and also by rm and establishment specic characteristics. We start
with an estimation controlling for worker specic-e¤ects and, then, estimate a model
that allows to account simultaneously for worker and rm xed-e¤ects following the
19To deal with the shortcomings of the xed e¤ects estimation we explored the use of an instrumental variables
estimator (IV). We used the establishment concentration in the region where the individual worked as a possible
instrument (the higher the parent-rms concentration of establishments in the region where the individual was working
the higher the probability of performing a same employer transfer without changing region because, in that region,
the worker has a larger set of possible destinations). Instead of a binomial treatment, we used a maximum simulated
likelihood method to estimate a multinomial treatment e¤ects model following the approach of Deb and Trivedi (2006a,
2006b). The obtained results were relatively similar to the OLS results leading us to conclude that, although the
instrument is statistically signicant in the MNL model and has the expected e¤ect on the probability of being a same
employer mover, apparently it seems not to be working well.
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methodology explored by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) that implement a full Gauss-
Seidel algorithm to estimate regression models with high-dimensional xed-e¤ects. The
main advantage of the chosen procedure is the ability to estimate a very large number
of two-way xed e¤ects under minimal memory requirements.
The standard within groups panel data estimator is analytically identical to the
di¤erence in di¤erences (DID) estimator of the average e¤ect on individuals that were
assigned to treatments20 (ATT) (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) and so, the shortcomings
of both methodologies are the same. Suppose mit denotes the treatment status of
individual i at time t where mi = 0 accounts for our basecategory, the DID estimator
is just the rst di¤erences estimator commonly applied to panel data in the presence of
xed e¤ects. This means that a way of obtaining bDID is to take the rst di¤erences
and obtain:
Wit1  Wit0 = imit + (nt1   nt0) + (oit1   oit0)
Where oit represent the transitory idiosyncratic shocks and nt is an aggregate macro
shock. Under the DID assumptions, the above regression equation can be consistently
estimated using OLS. Notice that the DID assumptions also imply that the transitory
shocks oit are uncorrelated with the treatments.
This allows the identication of the ATT between periods t1 and t0. For treatment
group 1 we get:
ATT = E [i j mi = 1]
= E [Wit j mi = 1; t = t1]  E [Wit j mi = 1; t = t0] 
 E [Wit j mi = 0; t = t1]  E [Wit j mi = 0; t = t0]
The sample analog is the DID estimator:bDID = hW 1t1  W 1t0i  hW 0t1  W 0t0i
where W
d
t is the average outcome over group d at time t. DID measures the excess
outcome change for the treated as compared to the non-treated, this way identifying
the ATT,
E
bDID = ATT
As the xed e¤ects panel data estimator is equivalent to the DID estimator it is
relevant to briey discuss the weaknesses of the methodologies (Blundell and Dias,
20We recall that the four treatments match with the four di¤erent types of mobility identied.
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2009):
 Selection on idiosyncratic temporary shocks
The procedure doesnt control for unobserved temporary individual specic shocks
that may have an inuence on the mobility decision, therefore having an inuence on the
participation decision. If the transitory shocks oit are not uncorrelated to the treatment
then the DID estimator is inconsistent.
To illustrate this shortcoming we may recall the Ashenfelters dip (Ashenfelter,
1978 and Heckman and Smith, 1999). If the enrollment in a training program is more
likely to occur when the worker experiences a temporary dip in earnings then, a faster
earnings growth is expected among the treated, even without program participation and
the DID estimator is likely to over-estimate the impact of the treatment. Considering
our mobility decisions, suppose that mobility is driven by a temporary change in the
spouses workplace. In this case we expect a lower or no wage premium and the DID
estimator is likely to under-estimate the impact of the treatment.
 Di¤erential macro trends
The identication of ATT using DID also relies on the assumption that treated and
controls experience common trends or, in other words, face the same macro shocks.
1.4.2 Empirical Results
1.4.2.1 Returns to mobility: Same Employer Transfers and Migration Premiums .
In the rst column of Table 1.13 we report results for the wage equation using OLS.
The second and third columns show the results for the worker xed e¤ects and for the
worker and rm xed e¤ects, respectively. 21 22
21The reported estimations use the second and more demanding denition of region change. Results using the rst
denition are shown in Appendix E (we recall that the rst and less demanding denition of region change identies
a migration by a change in the district where the individual works). We may observe that the results are similar to
the ones reported although, as expected, the premiums for region change are slightly lower, consistent with the shorter
distances implied by the rst denition of region change.
22The reported estimations use average hourly earnings (including irregular earnings). Results using only regular wages
are reported in Appendix F. We observe that the estimated wage premiums are slightly lower than the ones reported,
particularly for region changes, which is consistent with the hypothesis that some pay di¤erential for transferred employees
take the form of irregular benets.
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OLS Worker FE Worker and rm FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
SESR0 -0.0047*** (-3.17 ) 0.0163*** (17.61) 0.0124*** (13.27)
SESR1 0.0021 (1.26) 0.0245*** (21.85) 0.0206*** (18.57)
SESR2 0.0002 (0.08 ) 0.0247*** (15.34) 0.0284*** (13.33)
SESR3 0.0047* (1.64) 0.0274*** (15.31) 0.0242*** (13.94)
SESR4 -0.0230*** (-4.78) 0.0181*** (6.38) 0.0144*** (5.27)
SECR0 0.1095*** (24.40 ) 0.0387*** (16.35) 0.0335*** (14.47)
SECR1 0.1390*** (21.11 ) 0.0416*** (12.11) 0.0362*** (10.91)
SECR2 0.1538*** (16.20 ) 0.0417*** (8.35) 0.0364*** (7.89)
SECR3 0.1476*** (11.33) 0.0426*** (5.19) 0.0387*** (4.77)
SECR4 0.1579*** (7.56 ) 0.0434*** (4.37) 0.0391*** (4.11)
Age 0.0470*** (104.04 ) 0.0475*** (88.39) 0.0449*** (78.10)
Age squared -0.0418*** (-76.84 ) -0.0351*** (-54.74) -0.0317*** (-48.20)
Female -0.2810*** (-217.48)
Education 4 -1.1632*** (-450.60) -0.0878*** (-26.62) -0.0552*** (-16.19)
Education 9 -0.8687*** (-360.78) -0.0770*** (-26.30) -0.0505*** (-16.79)
Education 12 -0.5743*** (-226.02) -0.0642*** (-23.73) -0.0473*** (-17.14)
Tenure months 0.0010*** (47.44) 0.0002*** (13.85) 0.0002*** (11.87)
Tenure squared -0.0001*** (-9.28) -0.0000 (-0.46) 0.0000** (-1.97)
Size 0.0355*** (110.51) 0.0271*** (138.80) 0.0327*** (29.57)
CESR0 0.0553*** (29.08) 0.0120*** (9.37) -0.0055*** (-3.29)
CESR1 0.0589*** (32.01 ) 0.0226*** (17.28) 0.0017 (0.98)
CESR2 0.0616*** (28.89 ) 0.0310*** (20.43) 0.0084*** (4.41)
CESR3 0.0577*** (21.40 ) 0.0314*** (17.34) 0.0101*** (4.79)
CESR4 0.0502*** (13.31 ) 0.0333*** (13.14) 0.0128*** (4.75)
CECR0 0.0640*** (10.52 ) -0.0113*** (-3.06) -0.0117 (-0.55)
CECR1 0.0980*** (11.48 ) 0.0145*** (3.06) 0.0600 (1.09)
CECR2 0.1437*** (11.72 ) 0.0369*** (5.93) 0.0241*** (3.55)
CECR3 0.1502*** (9.62 ) 0.0391** (2.43) 0.0380 (0.47)
CECR4 0.1674*** (5.52 ) 0.0351** (2.47) 0.0254* (1.83)
Constant 1.1801*** (131.57 ) 0.4076*** (34.12)
R
2
0.5649 0.9093
N 1545920 1545920 1545920
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of average real hourly earnings (regular and irregular);
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
Cluster-robust t statistics in parentheses for the OLS model: clustered (id_worker).
***, **, * denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.13: Regressions for wages, 2000-2005
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Analyzing the results obtained with the OLS and FE models we conclude that they
are broadly consistent with usual ndings. Wages increase with age, tenure and educa-
tion, are higher for men and larger rms tend to pay higher wages.
Looking at the OLS estimation, we observe that the premiums for local same em-
ployer transfers are low and/or statistically insignicant23. However, for the group of
same employer transfers involving region changes, premiums are large and statistically
signicant. In the year of the transfer these same employer migrants earn 11,6% more
than the reference group24 and, in the years that follow, the premium increases until
17,1% four years after the transfer. Using OLS we conclude that the reward for changes
that imply a migration is considerably large.
Looking at the xed-e¤ects estimations we see that, although the estimated premi-
ums are always statistically signicant, the wage premium for migration is considerably
lower than using OLS.
Unlike the OLS estimation, for the xed e¤ects regressions we nd positive and
statistically signicant wage premiums even for same employer transfers without region
changes. These wage premiums may result from the accumulation of rm specic human
capital and progression in the rmsinternal labor markets. Bartel (1979) also nds
that the wage premiums of transferred workers are larger than the gains of employees
that are not transferred. By accepting the change, an employee may show continued
willingness to work on behalf of the organization and may gain skills that will lead
to enhanced future opportunities (Ostro¤ and Clark, 2001). These e¤ects may be
reected in the wage premiums that we observe for the group of locally transferred
workers. Including worker FE, for local changes, premiums range from 1,6% in the year
of the change to 2,8% in the third year after the change. For same employer migrants
we observe a wage premium of 3,9% in the year of the change increasing to 4,4% four
years after the change. Comparing the size of these premiums with the OLS results
we conclude that individual unobserved heterogeneity is extremely relevant for mobility
decisions. Still, we nd that the reward is around 2 p.p. higher when employees have to
23 In the xed e¤ects regression we nd positive and statistically signicant wage premiums even for same-employer
transfers without region changes.
24To calculate the discrete percentage change in y induced by x the matematical transformation exp (coef:)   1 is
employed.
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incur in the additional costs involved in migration. When we observe a region change,
the premium includes, not only the progression in the internal labor market but also the
compensating di¤erential for migration. The di¤erence between the premiums for these
two groups provides an estimation of the wage premium for migration. However, it may
be argued that for same-employer transfers we should distinguish between rm-specic
human capital and establishment-specic human capital. When workers are engaged
in a same employer transfer, they are able to protect rm-specic human capital but
loose their establishment-specic human capital. This loss may be particularly relevant
in transfers to a more distant location and might lead to a negative wage premium
after the change to an establishment in a di¤erent region. If this loss occurs, then, the
observed di¤erential will estimate a lower bound for the migration premium and
the actual migration premium will be higher. Our results also appear to corroborate
ndings from migration literature pointing out that returns to migration are not limited
to the migration year (Schae¤er, 1985 and Yankow, 2003) increasing the relevance of
tracking individuals in the years that follow the transfer.
We might also look at the results for the two groups of employer changers estimating
migration premiums by comparing the outcomes of individuals who change job and
migrate against the outcomes of those individuals changing employers locally (Yankow,
2003). However, the interpretation of these results demands additional caution as the
information contained in our dataset does not allow us to separate voluntary quits from
involuntary layo¤s. Some of these migrants that change employer, particularly those
for whom the separation is involuntary, may fail to obtain better wages at the new
employer and the observed premium will depend on this proportion of individuals that
fail to obtain better wage opportunities.25
As rm specic e¤ects may also be relevant for the determination of labor market
outcomes in the third column of Table 1.13 we observe the results for the worker and
rm xed e¤ects estimation.26
25We also estimated a more parsimonious regression not controlling for employers characteristics. This regression
showed considerably larger premiums for all groups. This nding is in line with recent empirical work on wage deter-
mination showing that employers characteristics are a crucial determinant of workerswages (Carneiro and Portugal,
2006).
26Results with worker and establishment specic e¤ects are quite similar and are reported in Appendix G.
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With the two FE most of the conclusions previously obtained with the worker specic
e¤ects remain valid. We conclude that even though rm specic e¤ects are also relevant,
controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity is of utmost importance. With two FE,
although we observe a slight decrease in the premiums, the migration premium mea-
sured by the di¤erential between local and non-local same-employer transfers continues
to be around 2 p.p.
1.4.2.2 Returns to mobility: Same Employer Transfers to New vs Old Establishments .
We have previously discussed that same employer transfers may have di¤erent mo-
tivations and the opening of a new establishment is one of those motivations. When
the rm opens a new plant, it may consider hiring in the internal labor market and we
recall that around 30% of all same employer moves are made to new establishments.
Table 1.14 reports the di¤erence in the wage premiums for transfers to new and to
pre-existing establishments. Wage premiums seem to be higher for workers that are
transferred to new establishments which is consistent with the higher responsibilities
that may be demanded from workers that are transferred to a new establishment and
therefore may be responsible for its success or failure.
1.4.2.3 Returns to mobility: Same Employer Transfers to Urban vs Non-urban Areas .
When analyzing wage premiums, the region of destination may also matter as the
wage di¤erential can depend on the local amenities and disamenities of regions.
We may distinguish moves to rural areas from moves to urban areas. Urban areas
have a higher cost of living and workers transferred to these regions may demand a
higher wage premium to compensate for the higher prices. The existence of a larger
compensating di¤erential for moves to large urban areas might also arise from other
disamenities such as pollution or excessive tra¢ c. On the other hand, as urban areas
ensure proximity to services and infrastructures, workers transferred to rural areas may
also demand a larger compensating di¤erential to balance for regional asymmetries,
disparities and travel costs.
It may be interesting to scrutinize which of these e¤ects prevail. In Portugal we
identify two large urban areas: Lisboa and Porto. Further developing our analysis, in
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Worker FE Worker and rm FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
new_SESR0 0.0284*** (19.81) 0.0256*** (18.18)
new_SESR1 0.0346*** (18.70) 0.0318*** (17.73)
new_SESR2 0.0340*** (7.46) 0.0169*** (6.86)
new_SESR3 0.0329*** (9.20) 0.0308*** (8.99)
new_SESR4 0.0290*** (5.39) 0.0263*** (5.11)
new_SECR0 0.0409*** (8.23) 0.0427*** (8.86)
new_SECR1 0.0619*** (6.93) 0.0583*** (6.80)
new_SECR2 0.0614** (2.34) 0.0313** (2.44)
new_SECR3 0.0657 (0.91) 0.0147 (0.88)
new_SECR4 0.0675 (0.29) 0.0070 (0.28)
old_SESR0 0.0114*** (11.12) 0.0068*** (6.59)
old_SESR1 0.0202*** (16.22) 0.0157*** (12.77)
old_SESR2 0.0214*** (13.67) 0.0176*** (11.52)
old_SESR3 0.0249*** (12.76) 0.0212*** (11.21)
old_SESR4 0.0235*** (4.22) 0.0093*** (3.02)
old_SECR0 0.0381*** (15.09) 0.0312*** (12.71)
old_SECR1 0.0385*** (10.57) 0.0326*** (9.28)
old_SECR2 0.0411*** (8.07) 0.0366*** (7.49)
old_SECR3 0.0449*** (5.22) 0.0303*** (4.72)
old_SECR4 0.0493*** (4.60) 0.0442*** (4.31)
Age 0.0476*** (88.50) 0.0450*** (78.19)
Age squared -0.0351*** (-54.77) -0.0317*** (-48.21)
Education 4 -0.0877*** (-26.60) -0.0551*** (-16.15)
Education 9 -0.0770*** (-26.28) -0.0503*** (-16.74)
Education 12 -0.0642*** (-23.72) -0.0473*** (-17.13)
Tenure months 0.0002*** (13.94) 0.0003*** (11.97)
Tenure squared -0.0000 (-0.65) -0.0000** (-2.20)
Size 0.0270*** (69.48) 0.0327*** (29.51)
CESR0 0.0116*** (9.04) -0.0064*** (-3.77)
CESR1 0.0221*** (16.85) 0.0007 (0.40)
CESR2 0.0305*** (20.20) 0.0074*** (3.91)
CESR3 0.0309*** (17.10) 0.0093*** (4.40)
CESR4 0.0329*** (12.96) 0.0119*** (4.43)
CECR0 -0.0113*** (-3.06) -0.0116** (-2.55)
CECR1 0.0143*** (3.01) 0.0056 (1.02)
CECR2 0.0367*** (5.91) 0.0239*** (3.51)
CECR3 0.0189** (2.41) 0.0036 (0.44)
CECR4 0.0349** (2.46) 0.0251* (1.81)
Constant 0.4056 (33.94)
R
2
0.9093
N 1545920 1545920
Notes:
Dependent var.: Log of average real hourly earnings (reg. and irreg.)
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
***,**,* denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.14: FE and two FE regressions for wages distinguishing moves to new and pre-existing estab-
lishments: 2000-2005
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Table 1.15 we report a specication that distinguishes transfers to Lisboa or Porto, the
largest urban areas, from transfers to other regions. With this estimation we observe
that, for the group of workers that are transferred without changing region, those
moves that are performed outside the two largest cities have slightly higher premiums.
The most striking result obtained with this specication is that considering the group
of workers that change region, those workers migrating to inner areas show a
considerably larger premium when compared to workers that migrate into the
districts of the two Portuguese largest cities, Lisboa and Porto. Looking at the results
for the two xed e¤ects estimation, we see that migrations to Lisboa and Porto have
premiums that range from 1,2% in the year of the change to 3% two years after the
change, while for workers that move to other less central areas, the wage premiums
are signicantly higher and range from 6,4% in the year of the change to 8,4% four
years after the change. To interpret these results we should be aware that Lisboa and
Porto exert strong attraction on the rest of the country and that considerable regional
disparities are still prevalent. We recall that, in Portugal, almost one half of all region
changes are made to Lisboa or Porto. We have more workers willing to migrate to
Lisboa or Porto than to other destinations and to encourage migration to other regions
workers need to be paid a considerably higher compensating di¤erential. We observe
that, in order to move into inner and less developed regions of Portugal, workers demand
an additional wage premium of around 5 p.p..
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Worker FE Worker and rm FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
PL_SESR0 0.0130*** (11.67) 0.0083*** (7.42)
PL_SESR1 0.0208*** (15.01) 0.0162*** (11.81)
PL_SESR2 0.0210*** (11.24) 0.0164*** (9.42)
PL_SESR3 0.0295*** (12.91) 0.0258*** (11.68)
PL_SESR4 0.0176** (2.06) 0.0132 (0.89)
PL_SECR0 0.0174*** (5.96) 0.0121*** (4.27)
PL_SECR1 0.0255*** (5.75) 0.0209*** (4.90)
PL_SECR2 0.0258* (1.83) 0.0291 (1.47)
PL_SECR3 0.0291 (0.84) 0.0262 (0.51)
PL_SECR4 0.0215 (0.24) 0.0203 (0.02)
Ot_SESR0 0.0221*** (16.33) 0.0193*** (14.39)
Ot_SESR1 0.0302*** (18.88) 0.0213*** (17.49)
Ot_SESR2 0.0349*** (12.43) 0.0223*** (11.49)
Ot_SESR3 0.0361*** (10.35) 0.0237*** (9.74)
Ot_SESR4 0.0319*** (7.84) 0.0293*** (7.50)
Ot_SECR0 0.0638*** (20.81) 0.0617*** (19.75)
Ot_SECR1 0.0649*** (12.94) 0.0684*** (12.11)
Ot_SECR2 0.0756*** (11.02) 0.0709*** (10.77)
Ot_SECR3 0.0853*** (7.23) 0.0714*** (6.99)
Ot_SECR4 0.0861*** (6.52) 0.0808*** (6.40)
Age 0.0476*** (88.44) 0.0449*** (78.09)
Age squared -0.0351*** (54.77) -0.0317*** (-48.21)
Education 4 -0.0879*** (-26.65) -0.0554*** (-16.23)
Education 9 -0.0771*** (-26.34) -0.0506*** (-16.85)
Education 12 -0.0642*** (-23.76) -0.0475*** (-17.19)
Tenure months 0.0002*** (13.84) 0.0003*** (11.89)
Tenure squared -0.0000 (-0.48) -0.0000** (-2.00)
Size 0.0270*** (69.46) 0.0328*** (29.65)
CESR0 0.0118*** (9.20) -0.0063*** (-3.73)
CESR1 0.0224*** (17.13) 0.0010 (0.55)
CESR2 0.0308*** (20.41) 0.0076*** (4.00)
CESR3 0.0312*** (17.25) 0.0094*** (4.42)
CESR4 0.0331*** (13.05) 0.0120*** (4.44)
CECR0 -0.0113*** (-3.06) -0.0120 (-2.63)
CECR1 0.0144*** (3.03) 0.0055 (1.01)
CECR2 0.0368*** (5.92) 0.0237*** (3.49)
CECR3 0.0191** (2.43) 0.0034 (0.42)
CECR4 0.0350** (2.46) 0.0249* (1.79)
Constant 0.4071*** (34.08)
R
2
0.9093
N 1545920 1545920
Notes:
Dependent variable: Log of average real hourly earnings (reg and irreg)
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
***,**,* denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.15: Two FE regression for wages distinguishing moves to Lisboa or Porto
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper we look at worker transitions within and across employers and within
and across regions. The main contribution of our work is the ability to reconcile the
spatial and the rm dimensions of mobility revealing the spatial dimension of internal
labor markets. Focusing on multi-plant rms where intra-rm mobility may involve
a relocation of the workplace, we develop on the relatively low explored interaction
between internal labor markets and migration theories.
We use a MNL model to analyze the individual determinants of each type of move.
We conclude that same employer movers are mainly low tenured men that have not been
promoted or received wage increases in the past few years and for whom the transfer
may be seen as an investment to improve their career and wage perspectives inside the
rm. We observed that more than 20% of these same employer transfers were related
to a promotion event in the year of the move.
We also found that these same employer movers may be very high skilled or very low
skilled workers and that, for the former, same employer transfers may be a less costly
and less risky way to migrate. We also looked at the wage premium associated with the
di¤erent types of moves trying to assess whether they di¤er and why. The longitudinal
dimension of our matched employer-employee dataset allow us track individuals and to
observe lagged premiums for mobility. Comparing wage premiums for the group of same
employer transfers involving region changes with the group of same employer movers
that were locally transferred, we suggest a new approach to estimate the migration
premium. We conclude that there exists a larger reward when employees have to incur
in additional costs such as those involved in migration. However, we also nd that
worker and rm specic characteristics are extremely relevant for this decision and
that taking into account individual and rm unobserved heterogeneity considerably
decreases the value of the premium. Our results suggest that wage premiums are, at
least, 2 p.p. higher when the internally transferred worker has to migrate.
We conclude that same employer transfers prevail in large rms and the results seem
to suggest that mobility across establishments within the same employer is a channel to
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improve wage growth opportunities. This is consistent with our initial hypothesis that
in multi-plant rms there exists a global internal labor market which is built on the rm
as a whole. We focused on the relation between same employer relocations and internal
labor markets, however, a transfer to another establishment may be driven by several
di¤erent reasons and workers may have to move to regions with di¤erent amenities.
Our results suggest that for migrations to less central regions the wage premium paid
may be 5 p.p. higher than for migration to large urban areas. We also found that
premiums for transfers to new establishments are higher.
We conclude that the relatively low studied group of internally relocated individuals
deserves further research. We found that among the group of movers, migrations with-
out changing employer are extremely important as they account for more than three
fourth of all migrations. However, these moves may be very heterogeneous and this het-
erogeneity may mask the wage premium because we may be just capturing an average
e¤ect. These transfers may also a¤ect the workers career perspectives and this impact
on careers deserves being explored. We believe that future research for this group of
internally transferred workers should explore deeper into this heterogeneity.
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Appendix A
Hierarchical levels dened by law (Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, de 2 Junho):
Level Description
Level 1 Top executives (top management)
Level 2 Intermediary executives (middle management)
Level 3 Supervisors, team leaders, foremen
Level 4 High-skilled professionals
Level 5 Skilled professionals
Level 6 Semi-skilled professionals
Level 7 Non-skilled professionals
Level 8 Apprentices, interns, trainees
Appendix B
CAE - Portuguese Classication of Economic Activities (equivalent to SIC codes):
CAE Description
CAE A Agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and forestry
CAE B Fishing
CAE C Mining and quarrying
CAE D Manufacturing
CAE E Electricity, gas and water supply
CAE F Construction
CAE G Wholesale and retail trade
CAE H Hotels and restaurants
CAE I Transport, storage and communication
CAE J Financial activities
CAE K Real estate, renting and business activities
CAE L Public administration, community, social and personal services
CAE M Education
CAE N Health and social work
CAE O Other community, social and personal service activities
CAE P Families with household employee
CAE Q International institutions and other extra-territorial organizations
Note: In our nal dataset there are no observations for cae P.
42
1. THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS
Appendix C
Variables denition:
Variable Description
Tenure36 Tenure less than 36 months
Tenure96 Tenure between 36 and 96 months
Age Workers age (in years)
Age squar Square of workers age (divided by 100)
Female Gender dummy equal 1 for female
Educ4 Dummy for 4 or less years of schooling
Educ9 Dummy for 6 or 9 years of schooling
Educ12 Dummy for 12 years of schooling
Promotion [-3,0] Dummy equal 1 if the worker was promoted in the previous 3 years
lnW Real hourly wage (in log)
Size Firm size (log number of workers)
Tenure months Tenure in months
Tenure months squared Squared tenure in months (divided by100)
SESRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. in the same region
SECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. with region change
CECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing employer in the same region
CECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing employer with region change
PL_SESRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. in the same region (Lisboa or Porto)
PL_SECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. and region (to Lisboa or Porto)
Ot_SESRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. in the same region (other regions)
Ot_SECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing estab. and region (to other regions)
New_SESRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing to new estab./same region
New_SECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing to new estab./other region
Old_SESRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing to old estab./same region
Old_SECRX Dummy equal 1 X years after changing to old estab./other region
Est.Conc. Concentration of establishments of the rm in the region
Nationality Dummy equal 1 for foreign workers
Note: When the variable is added the su¢ x _p this means that it concerns to the previous year.
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Appendix D
As stated in Train (2003), mixed logit probabilities are the integrals of standard logit
probabilities over a density of parameters. Stated more explicitly, a mixed logit model
is any model whose choice probabilities can be expressed in the form:
Pni =
Z
Lni()f()d;
where Lni() is the logit probability evaluated at parameters :
Lni() =
eVni()
JX
j=1
eVnj()
and f() is a density function. Vni() is the observed portion of the utility, which
depends on the parameters . If utility is linear in , then Vni() = 
0
xni. In this case,
the mixed logit probability takes its usual form:
Pni =
Z 0B@ e0xniX
j
e
0
xnj
1CA f()d:
The mixed logit probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at
di¤erent values of , with the weights given by the density f().
Standard logit is a special case where the mixing distribution f() is degenerate at
xed parameters b: f() = 1 for  = b and 0 for  6= b. The choice probability then
becomes the simple logit formula:
Pni =
eb
0
xniX
j
eb
0
xnj
The mixed logit probability can be derived from utility-maximizing behavior in sev-
eral ways. The most widely used in recent applications is based on random coe¢ cients.
The decision maker faces a choice among J alternatives. The utility of person n from
alternative j is specied as:
Unj = 
0
nxnj + "nj
where xnj are observed variables that relate to the alternative or decision maker,
n is a vector of coe¢ cients of these variables for person n, and "nj is a random term
that is IID extreme value. The coe¢ cients vary over decision makers in the population
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with density f(). This density is a function of parameters that represent, for example,
the mean and covariance of the 0s in the population. This specication is the same
as for standard logit except that  varies over decision makers rather than being xed.
The researcher species a distribution for the coe¢ cients and estimates the parameters
of that distribution. In most applications, f() is specied to be normal or lognormal.
We used the Stata module mixlogit (Train 2003; Hole 2007) to perform the estima-
tion. We specied the choice-specic constants as varying across individuals and as
correlated across choices to account for unobserved dependencies among choices.
Due to time and computational reasons, the estimation results we report bellow only
considers three types of mobility (instead of ve, as in the multinomial logit model) not
distinguishing between local and non-local changes:
1. The worker changes establishment within the same employer (identied as SE);
2. The worker changes employer;
3. The worker remains in the same establishment of the same employer (used as
comparison).
We also used only regressors for age, gender and education and the years 2000 to
2003 of the panel. The results we obtained appear to validate the results obtained by
the multinomial logit model. Table 1.16 reports results for this mixed logit regression.
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Variables Coef. t-ratio
Age_SE 0,0105 43,14
Age_Change_employer -0,0333 -167,37
Female_SE -0,1714 -34,40
Female_Change_employer -0,1626 -43,06
Education 4_SE 0,8455 97,68
Education 4_Change_employer -0,4213 -59,12
Education 9_SE -0,6428 -77,50
Education 9_Change_employer -0,3239 -47,95
Education 12_SE -0,1334 -14,99
Education 12_Change_employer -0,2596 -34,53
SE -2,2941 -185,30
Change_employer -0,2715 -28,17
/111 0,0264 0,28
/121 0,0094 0,21
/122 0,0400 1,05
Table 1.16: Mixed Logit Model
NOTE: The nal three coe¢ cients are the elements of the lower-triangular matrix L, that is the Cholesky
factorization of the covariance matrix V . The covariance matrix for the random coe¢ cients V is given by
V = LL
0
.
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Appendix E
OLS Worker FE Worker and rm FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
SESR0 -0.0069*** (-4.68 ) 0.0166*** (17.53) 0.0100*** (13.35)
SESR1 0.0021 (1.22) 0.0258*** (22.34) 0.0188*** (17.53)
SESR2 0.0007 (0.32 ) 0.0266*** (15.49) 0.0253*** (13.11)
SESR3 0.0071** (2.40) 0.0292*** (15.79) 0.0204*** (11.92)
SESR4 -0.0246*** (-5.04) 0.0174*** (5.96) 0.012*** (5.44)
SECR0 0.0635*** (20.12 ) 0.0258*** (14.22) 0.0171*** (14.40)
SECR1 0.0642*** (15.32 ) 0.0267*** (10.57) 0.0244*** (8.92)
SECR2 0.0649*** (10.84 ) 0.0268*** (7.89) 0.0259*** (7.98)
SECR3 0.0675*** (6.17) 0.0299*** (4.76) 0.0287*** (4.21)
SECR4 0.0811*** (5.28 ) 0.0378*** (5.24) 0.0299*** (3.98)
Age 0.0471*** (104.15 ) 0.0475*** (88.31) 0.0470*** (80.10)
Age squared -0.0419*** (-76.92 ) -0.0351*** (-54.68) -0.0317*** (-49.27)
Female -0.2808*** (-217.27)
Education 4 -1.1639*** (-450.78) -0.0877*** (-26.61) -0.0543*** (-17.32)
Education 9 -0.8694*** (-361.01) -0.0770*** (-26.29) -0.0601*** (-17.79)
Education 12 -0.5748*** (-226.15) -0.0642*** (-23.73) -0.0484*** (-16.55)
Tenure months 0.0010*** (47.30) 0.0002*** (13.99) 0.0002** (11.75)
Tenure squared -0.0001*** (-9.24) -0.0000 (-0.59) -0.0000 (-0.98)
Size 0.0356*** (110.46) 0.0271*** (69.48) 0.0312*** (21.24)
CESR0 0.0572*** (29.39) 0.0119*** (9.12) -0.0012*** (-5.28)
CESR1 0.0589*** (31.55 ) 0.0219*** (16.47) 0.0010 (0.89)
CESR2 0.0621*** (28.65 ) 0.0312*** (20.32) 0.0056*** (8.41)
CESR3 0.0586*** (21.36 ) 0.0318*** (17.27) 0.0098*** (4.85)
CESR4 0.0504*** (13.27 ) 0.0338*** (13.10) 0.0101*** (7.27)
CECR0 0.0478*** (11.64 ) 0.0029 (1.08) -0.0148 (-0.53)
CECR1 0.0761*** (13.53 ) 0.0262*** (7.92) 0.0422 (1.00)
CECR2 0.0892*** (12.07 ) 0.0310*** (7.45) 0.0124*** (5.55)
CECR3 0.0823*** (8.77 ) 0.0207*** (4.05) 0.0188 (0.22)
CECR4 0.0896*** (4.98 ) 0.0258*** (2.86) 0.0201* (1.78)
Constant 1.1794*** (131.45 ) 0.4078*** (34.13)
R
2
0.5646 0.9011
N 1545920 1545920 1545920
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of average real hourly earnings
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
Cluster-robust t stat. in parentheses for OLS model: clust (id_worker)
***, **, * denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Table 1.17: Wage regressions using the rst denition of region change: 2000-2005
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Appendix F
OLS Worker FE Worker and rm FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
SESR0 -0.0072*** (-5.28 ) 0.0163*** (23.02) 0.0146*** (20.99)
SESR1 -0.0055*** (-3.52) 0.0189*** (22.06) 0.0170*** (20.63)
SESR2 -0.0108*** (-5.42 ) 0.0197*** (16.34) 0.0165*** (15.99)
SESR3 -0.0086*** (-3.28) 0.0202*** (14.73) 0.0196*** (15.07)
SESR4 -0.0216*** (-4.87) 0.0198*** (9.13) 0.0184*** (9.02)
SECR0 0.0635*** (15.22 ) 0.0311*** (17.16) 0.0294*** (17.18)
SECR1 0.1125*** (18.10 ) 0.0340*** (12.91) 0.0318*** (12.86)
SECR2 0.1429*** (15.93 ) 0.0379*** (10.32) 0.0367*** (10.66)
SECR3 0.1472*** (11.80) 0.0267*** (5.56) 0.0258*** (5.72)
SECR4 0.1481*** (7.79 ) 0.0259*** (3.41) 0.0253*** (3.55)
Age 0.0468*** (108.32 ) 0.0428*** (104.09) 0.0399*** (92.55)
Age squared -0.0413*** (-79.35 ) -0.0325*** (-66.30) -0.0288*** (-58.54)
Female -0.2492*** (-199.67)
Education 4 -1.1848*** (-471.10) -0.0985*** (-39.02) -0.0616*** (-24.62)
Education 9 -0.8870*** (-376.61) -0.0867*** (-38.68) -0.0568*** (-25.65)
Education 12 -0.5851*** (-234.91) -0.0706*** (-34.13) -0.0512*** (-25.15)
Tenure months 0.0011*** (55.07) 0.0004*** (34.61) 0.0005*** (30.62)
Tenure squared -0.0001*** (-14.00) -0.0001*** (-18.81) -0.0001*** (-20.78)
Size 0.0361*** (117.17) 0.0226*** (75.74) 0.0433*** (53.68)
CESR0 0.0537*** (30.04) 0.0170*** (20.18) 0.0097*** (7.80)
CESR1 0.0713*** (41.43 ) 0.0356*** (35.58) 0.0233*** (18.22)
CESR2 0.0671*** (33.51 ) 0.0325*** (28.18) 0.0186*** (13.36)
CESR3 0.0481*** (19.30 ) 0.0167*** (12.09) 0.0057*** (3.63)
CESR4 0.0383*** (10.92 ) 0.0160*** (8.25) 0.0064*** (3.22)
CECR0 0.0408*** (7.27 ) 0.0015 (330.52) 0.0084*** (2.72)
CECR1 0.0826*** (10.43 ) 0.0303*** (8.33) 0.0243*** (6.64)
CECR2 0.1061*** (9.84 ) 0.0316*** (6.64) 0.0225*** (4.82)
CECR3 0.1249*** (8.61 ) 0.0268** (4.46) 0.0147** (2.55)
CECR4 0.1299*** (4.87 ) 0.0175 (1.61) 0.0121 (1.18)
Constant 1.1135*** (130.03 ) 0.5101*** (55.79)
R
2
0.6016 0.9459
N 1545920 1545920 1545920
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of average real hourly earnings (regular and irregular);
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
Cluster-robust t statistics in parentheses for the OLS model: clustered (id_worker).
***, **, * denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.18: Wage regressions using only regular earnings: 2000-2005
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Appendix G
Worker and establishment FE
Variables Coef. t-ratio
SESR0 0.0088*** (6.47)
SESR1 0.0151*** (10.03)
SESR2 0.0172*** (9.96)
SESR3 0.0234*** (11.60)
SESR4 0.0154*** (5.36)
SECR0 0.0188*** (6.69)
SECR1 0.0204*** (5.57)
SECR2 0.0232*** (4.86)
SECR3 0.0254** (2.53)
SECR4 0.0286*** (3.05)
Age 0.0426*** (71.08)
Age squared -0.0291*** (-43.41)
Female
Education 4 -0.0499*** (-14.76)
Education 9 -0.0464*** (-15.53)
Education 12 -0.0458*** (-16.67)
Tenure months 0.0002*** (11.00)
Tenure squared -0.0001*** (-3.88)
Size 0.0329*** (28.28)
CESR0 -0.0042** (-2.05)
CESR1 0.0053** (2.52)
CESR2 0.0132*** (5.96)
CESR3 0.0175*** (7.32)
CESR4 0.0213*** (7.34)
CECR0 -0.0170*** (-3.65)
CECR1 0.0002 (0.03)
CECR2 0.0192*** (2.97)
CECR3 0.0009 (0.11)
CECR4 0.0235* (1.74)
Constant
R
2
0.9142
N 1545920
Notes: Dependent variable: Log of average real hourly earnings;
Specication also includes a set of time and industry dummies;
***,**,* denote statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Table 1.19: Wage regression with worker and establishment xed e¤ects: 2000-2005
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2 Internal Hirings and the Survival of New Establishments
* We are grateful to Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEP) for providing the
data for this research.
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2.1 Introduction
The determinants of new plants survival has been the subject of extensive previous
research. An important piece of this literature has examined the survival and hazard
rates of new plants that are a¢ liated with pre-established rms. It has been found
that the factors a¤ecting the survival of new entrants are di¤erent depending on wether
the entry is attempted by a new or by an already established rm (Dunee et al, 1989;
Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994; Mata et al., 1995; Mitchell, 1994). Being owned by a
pre-established rm may give the new plant several types of advantages. These entrants
may have better access to resources and nancial markets since they are a¢ liated with
a pre-existing rm that has built a reputation (Brito and Mello, 1995), and being
a¢ liated to a group can also be an important source of economies of scale (Ingram,
1996). The parent rm may also supply expertise in management and operational
knowledge which can help the entrant in the development of a successful entry strategy
that will positively a¤ect the new units performance. Indeed, the development of rm-
specic learning e¤ects contribute to reductions in production cost and may positively
a¤ect survival (Darr, Argote, and Epple,1995). Looking at the importance of knowledge
transfer, Ingram and Baum (1997) analyzed the importance of chain a¢ liation in the
Manhattan hotel industry, while Darr et al. (1995) studied organizational learning
and the transfer of knowledge among pizza stores, and Greve (1996) examined radio
broadcasters which shared a common corporate owner. These studies highlight the
importance of knowledge transfer within organizations and conclude that being part of
a chain may improve the chances of survival of individual businesses.
While some works take as granted that belonging to a group brings increased and
easier access to knowledge, one central issue relates to the channels or strategies by
which the transfer of knowledge occurs. Several mechanisms were proposed in the lit-
erature. Some argue that this transfer results from regular communication that can
facilitate the di¤usion of innovation and the transfer of technology (Tushman, 1977;
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; and Rothwell, 1978), while others emphasize the impor-
tance of personal acquaintances and personal ties in the transfer of learning (Huberman,
1983; Martilla, 1971; Liebenz, 1982 and Tushman, 1977). Dutton and Starbuck (1978)
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highlighted the importance of regular meetings as a channel to transfer learning since
more opportunities for communication and competence sharing among corporate units
would result in self-imitation within the corporation (Greve, 1996) and learning would
occur in the form of interorganizational imitative behavior (Ingram and Baum,1997).
Our work extends the study of the channels by which the parent rm (or other units
in the same group) can transfer knowledge to the newly opened branch as the ties and
connections between several units of the same rm go beyond regular communications.
This chapter contributes to this literature by focusing on a specic mechanism of within-
rm transfer of knowledge that has been neglected so far - the transfer of workers from
pre-existing to newly-created establishments of the same rm. The novelty in our work
is to focus on the role that intra-rm mobility plays as a channel for supplying and
transferring knowledge and expertise to the new unit and to analyze the impact of this
strategy on the new units survival. As knowledge and rm-specic capital is mainly
embodied, analyzing the role of intra-rm transfers allows us to asses the importance
of knowledge transfer on the new units survival. These internal movements not only
strengthen personal ties and increase the probability that personal acquaintances ex-
ist but also embody a direct channel for knowledge transfer that has not been
addressed in previous literature.
Intra-rm mobility is an essential question in personnel economics. When a pre-
established rm considers the decision to open a new establishment, it has to make
choices on how to ll the vacancies created in the new plant. The rm has two options,
it can hire in the external labor market or it can opt to ll the vacancy through internal
reallocation, transferring an employee from another unit within the same organization.
Internal hires are a central channel to transfer rm-specic human capital and expertise
and leads us to the concept of internal labor markets (ILM) and to the seminal work of
Doeringer and Piore (1971). In essence, the decision on how to ll the jobs in the newly
created establishment is akin to the internal promotion decision which is central to the
ILM literature. Although ILM literature typically focuses on single-establishment rms
(Baker et al., 1994a, 1994b) the fact is that, in multi-plant rms, the existence of an
internal labor market will not be restricted to one particular establishment but will
58
2. INTERNAL HIRINGS AND THE SURVIVAL OF NEW ESTABLISHMENTS
be based on the rm as a whole, necessarily including all the units belonging to that
parent rm.27
Several factors may explain the existence of internal hiring and the creation of an
internal labor market. ILM may be a response to matching e¤ects (Jovanovic, 1979)
or may result from the rms incentive structure (Lazear, 1979). Moreover, risk-averse
employers may prefer to hire from within as internal employeesability can be observed
with less noise (Greenwald, 1979). Intra-rm mobility is also a response to the existence
of specic human capital (Becker, 1962). For newly created establishments this argu-
ment is particularly relevant as the internally transferred employees may be responsible
for expertise transfer that can be crucial for the new units survival. A very well known
paper from Gibbons and Waldman (1999) develops on the role of learning and human
capital acquisition as possible explanations for the observed paths of careers inside the
organization. Once a worker acquires rm-specic human capital, his value inside the
rm deviates from that at other rms. The longer the tenure of the worker, the more
specic human capital accumulated and the more costly it would be for the rm to nd
an external candidate who could outperform an existing worker.
Considering the extension of the internal labor marketstheory into a multi-plant
framework we will be interested in analyzing the existence of "ports of entry". In the
newly created establishment some jobs will be lled with workers working at other
establishments in the same rm whereas other jobs will be lled with individuals hired
outside the rm. The latter are, in the ILM terminology, the true ports-of-entry to
the establishment, and again, according to the ILM literature are those jobs within
the establishment that require less rm-specic human capital. These are, presumably,
lower-rank jobs. Higher-rank jobs, on the contrary, require more rm-specic human
capital which can only be acquired by working in the rm. Hence, these jobs will be lled
from within, i.e., through internal transfers of workers from pre-existing establishments
to the new one. In this chapter, our rst objective is to characterize the recruitment
policy of new establishments a¢ liated with multi-establishment rms, analyzing the
importance of internal and external hires at di¤erent hierarchical levels. Our hypothesis
27The hypothesis that, in multi-establishment rms, internal labor markets are based on the rm as a whole was
thoroughly discussed in the rst chapter of this dissertation.
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is that, at the new unit, internal transfers will increase at higher hierarchical levels
(Lazear and Oyer, 2004).
The second objective of this paper is to asses if internal hires, specially at higher
levels a¤ect the survival of new establishments. This is an indirect way to test if intra-
rm mobility is motivated by the need to transfer rm specic knowledge to the new
unit. If this is the case we will observe a positive e¤ect of internal hiring on survival.
Our main hypothesis is that internal hiring a¤ects survival because it works as a direct
channel for knowledge transfer. We believe this channel can work in two ways: rst,
a higher proportion of internally hired employees can increase personal contacts and
acquaintances between the new plant and the other units of the group improving and
smoothing communication. Second, a higher proportion of internal hiring at the top
of the hierarchy will be particularly important as the transfer of knowledge and rm-
specic human capital is predominantly carried out by workers at higher-rank jobs.
Indeed, if strategic decisions that a¤ect the new plants survival are dened its probable
that this occurs at higher hierarchical levels. On this premise, Lima and Martins (2006)
assess the impact of external recruitment of top managers on rm performance and
several studies on managerial succession address the impact of internal versus external
hiring of CEO (Lauterbach et al., 1999, Furtado and Karan, 1994) and of CEO turnover
(Murphy, 1999; Huson et al., 2004) on the rms performance. Chan (1996) o¤ers us
another argument for believing that internal hiring at top levels is particularly relevant
for the survival of the new plant. Chan concludes that, to promote e¤ort, employers
give an handicap to internal employees and only when an external candidate shows a
signicant margin of superiority will existing employees be passed over. However, the
magnitude of the handicap di¤ers at di¤erent levels of an organization, diminishing as
one moves up the hierarchy. At more senior levels, the number of potential competitors
tends to be smaller, so the handicap should also be smaller and can even be negative at
the top of the pyramid. While lower-rank internal contestants enjoy a positive handicap,
which prevents them from giving up, those of high abilities may instead nd the contest
rigged against them to prevent an e¤ortless win. This means that internal employees
hired to higher-rank jobs are more likely to have won on the basis of their ability rather
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than as a result of the handicap given by the employer. Indeed, we will conclude that
the proportion of internal hires at high level jobs is particularly crucial for the new
plants survival.
The paper will be organized as follows: in section 2.2 we detail our sample design and
characterize the data; sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the models and discuss the results
and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The data
2.2.1 Data description and sample design
The dataset in this study was constructed using Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a matched
employer-employee administrative record. QP is an annual mandatory employment
questionnaire collected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor that all rms with wage
earners are legally obliged to ll in. The data include establishment-specic details (em-
ployment, location, industry), information on the rm with which the establishment is
a¢ liated (location, industry, number of establishments, employment, sales, ownership,
legal framework), and workforce characteristics (gender, age, education, occupation,
tenure, earnings, hours of work). Data are collected once per year in October.
Firms, establishments and workers entering the database are assigned a unique iden-
tifying number and the Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a unit that
has previously reported to the database is not assigned a di¤erent identication number.
The dataset has a longitudinal dimension, which allows us to track rms, establishments
and workers over time and to match workers with their rms and establishments.
In this chapter we use the 2003 to 2008 waves of QP. The data corresponding to
years 2003 to 2005 are used to identify the creation of new establishments. Each
new establishment is followed for three years after its creation, so units created in
2003 are followed until 2006, the ones created in 2004 are tracked until 2007 and new
establishments in 2005 are followed until 2008. We identify an establishment entry
whenever information for that establishment is reported to QP for the rst time in the
corresponding spell, i.e., if the establishment is not present in any of the preceding waves
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of the data28. Similarly, we will identify an establishment exit in one year whenever
information for the establishment is absent for that year and for all subsequent years,
i.e., if the establishment is not present in any of the subsequent waves of the data 29.
In the dataset, an establishment is dened as a single business location of a rm, new
establishments being assigned di¤erent identication numbers. Given this denition we
will observe an opening if the rm creates a new establishment but also if an existing
establishment is relocated or if a new plant is created after the merger and/or closure of
previously existing units of the rm. As shown in Table 2.1, 157953 new establishments
were created in the 3 years period between 2003 and 2005. These new establishments
employ almost 700 thousand workers. In Table 2.2 we observe that these newborn units
are a¢ liated with rms that have, on average, 1.6 establishments and 13 workers. Firms
with only one establishment are clearly predominant in the data and we conclude that
more than three fourths of the observed entries are single-establishment rms.
2003 2004 2005 2003-2005
Number of new establishments 50942 46805 60206 157953
Number of workers 235343 203918 255731 694992
Estab. average number of workers 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.4
Table 2.1: Characterizing new establishments
2003 2004 2005
Number of rms: 45335 41789 53989
Single-establishment 39627 36395 48370
Multi-establishment 5708 5394 5619
Firm average number of estab. 1.6 1.6 1.6
Firm average number of workers 13.6 13.2 12.1
Firm average age (in years) 4.9 5.0 6.9
Table 2.2: Characterizing rms
For the purpose of this paper, we are interested in newly created establishments
for which the corresponding parent rm has the option to transfer workers from other
28For each year, we use all previous spells of the data (since 1985) to identify an entry.
29For each year, we use all subsequent spells of the data until 2009.
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establishments within the organization. This possibility implies that the new establish-
ments in our sample have to be a¢ liated to a rm that pre-existed before the opening.
Our sample is further restricted to newly created establishments that belong to rms
that remain or become multi-establishment after the opening in year t30. Therefore,
we keep new establishments that belong to rms that are multi-establishment in both
periods, before the opening and in the year of the opening, but also rms that grow
from single to multi-establishment rm. The cases of single-single or multi-single were
excluded as these are either rms that closed down an establishment and opened a
replacement establishment (possibly due to simple relocation of the existing plant) or
rms that closed all its pre-existing establishments merging them into a newly cre-
ated unit. In both cases the "new" establishments are likely to be transformations of
pre-existing establishments rather than truly new units. Under these circumstances,
internally transferred workers will necessarily come from establishments that are clos-
ing and these transfers are expected to be driven by di¤erent factors than those that
we seek to investigate in this study.
In Table 2.3 we detail our sample restrictions.
Type of rm In the
Year before the opening (t-1) Opening year (t) sample?
Non existent Single or Multi No
Single-establishment Single-establishment No
Multi-establishment Single-establishment No
Single-establishment Multi-establishment Yes
Multi-establishment Multi-establishment Yes
Table 2.3: Sample design
Of the 157953 establishments that were created between 2003 and 2005, 32803
belong to rms that existed in the previous period but 8411 establishments were linked
to rms that were single-establishment after the opening and were also dropped from
the sample. Hence, the nal sample contains 24392 newly created establishments that
30The sample was obtained after performing consistency checks and some cleaning. Workers with an identication
number smaller than 100000 and duplicated workers for whom all variables exhibit the same value were dropped (these
workers represent less than 1%).
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are a¢ liated to a pre-established parent rm that is multi-establishment in year t. Our
sample of new establishments represent 15% of total openings in the period 2003-2005
and are responsible for 29% of the employment created by all new establishments. When
compared to the total group of new entrants, the establishments in our sample have
twice as many workers even though most of them are small and 55% employ only 3
workers or less.
As we restricted our sample to multi-establishment rms in year t it is not surprising
that the parent rms in our nal sample are considerably larger having, on average, 7
establishments and almost 100 workers. On the other hand, as we kept only rms that
pre-existed in year t-1, the fact that the rms in our sample are older is also expected.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 characterize our nal sample. Figure 2.1 characterizes the rms
considering the number of establishments owned. We observe that a large majority of
multi-estalishment rms have less than 10 establishments.
2003 2004 2005 2003-2005
Number of new establishments 8561 7820 8011 24392
Number of workers 67562 62137 69359 199058
Estab. average number of workers 8.3 8.4 8.7 8.5
Table 2.4: Sample characterization: establishments
2003 2004 2005
Number of rms 4566 4339 4343
Firm average number of estab. 6.5 6.6 7.0
Firm average number of workers 93.0 91.4 103.9
Firm average age (in years) 15.2 15.2 15.0
Table 2.5: Sample characterization: rms
2.2.2 Identifying internal hires
Matching information on workers, establishments and their rms we are able to classify
workers according to their origin. Internal hires in t, worked for the same employer but
in another establishment of the rm in the year t-1. For these workers, we observe a
change in the establishments identication number but the rms identication number
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Figure 2.1: Firm characterization by number of establishments
remains unchanged.31 32 Workers that meet this criterion may be in two very di¤erent
situations:
1. The worker is transferred from an establishment that remains active (henceforth,
Type I transfers);
2. The worker is transferred from an establishment that ceased its operations (hence-
forth, Type II transfers).
This distinction is important because the decision to transfer workers from establish-
ments that close (Type II transfers) is driven by di¤erent factors than those determining
Type I transfers, as they are alternative to a dismissal rather than a transfer driven
move. For Type I transfers we have the guarantee that the establishment where the
individual previously worked was not closed or relocated.
31We also included in this category workers that, in the previous year, dont appear in the dataset but show a tenure
higher than 12 months. This indicates that they already worked for that same rm in the previous year but, for some
reason, were not reported.
32This classication is straightforward if the individual works only for one employer. When the individual, in year t-1,
worked for more than one rm we classify him as an internal hire provided that the individual worked for the rm that
is opening the new establishment even if he also worked for other rms.
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Most remaining hiring situations are classied as external hirings. External hires
include workers that, in the previous wave of the data, were:
1. Employed with a di¤erent rm;
2. Not present, meaning that they were either out of the labor force (new labor market
entrants or re-entrants), unemployed, self-employed or employed as a civil servant.
There is, however, one last case of hirings that we cannot classify into any of the
above types of hiring, internal or external. This is a category of workers that are
employed at time t in a newly created establishment and undergo a change in the
identication number of the rm they are working for but their reported tenure is
longer than 12 months. This situation may be due either to workers hired externally
that were able to secure whatever tenure they accumulated in their previous job (which
may be important for certain types of employer-provided benets), or to workers that
are hired from other rms belonging to the same economic group as the destination
rm. In the former case, but not in the latter these are, indeed, external hires. As we
cannot separate one situation from the other we classify these situations into a separate
group denoting uncertain origin (henceforth referred to as uncertain origin transfers).
The incidence of these cases although small is by no means trivial33. In Figure 2.2 and
in Table 2.6 we sum up the ve origins that we consider in the empirical work.
?
New
Internal Labour Market External Labour Market
Internal: Type I
Internal: Type II
External: Other firm
Uncertain origin
External: Outside QP
Figure 2.2: Identifying the type of hiring.
33 In Table 2.9 we observe that uncertain origin transfers represent 8% of total hires.
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Origin Type of hiring Description
Internal Internal: Type I The unit where the individual worked in t-1 remains open
Internal: Type II The unit where the individual worked in t-1 closed
External External: outside QP The worker was out of QP dataset in t-1
External: other rm Firm id changes and tenure is lower than 12 months
Uncertain origin Firm id changes but tenure is higher than 12 months
Table 2.6: Type of hiring according to the workers origin
2.2.3 Characterizing the data
2.2.3.1 The establishment sample .
In this section we further characterize the establishments and describe their per-
sonnel. In terms of composition of the workforce, in our nal sample of newly created
establishments, we observe that the proportion of women is slightly higher than the pro-
portion of men. Although, on average, 41% of the workforce has less than 12 months
of tenure which is something we might expect in a new establishment we also nd a
high proportion (around 37%) of higher tenured workers which reveals the importance
of internal hiring when opening a new establishment. More than 75% of the workforce
of these newly-created establishments has between 25 and 54 years old and around
59% of the hired employees have 9 or less years of schooling. Our data also allows us
to characterize the establishments workforce according to workers hierarchical level34.
Frequently, these new establishments are small branches of the parent rm and so it is
not surprising that top executives represent less than 7% of the workforce and that only
17% of the new units have top executives in their personnel. We see that, on average,
over 70% of the hired workers are merely skilled or less than skilled professionals.
Looking at the establishmentsdistribution by economic activity and considering the
Portuguese Classication of Economic Activity (cae)35, in our sample, cae G, wholesale
and retail trade, stands out, accounting for 40% of the new plants. Financial activities,
real estate, renting and business activities (cae J and cae K) rank second accounting for
more the 20% of the new units in our sample. Regarding the geographical distribution,
34We distinguish eight hierarchical levels dened by law in Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, de 2 Junho (see Appendix A)
35Equivalent to Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) codes. See Appendix B.
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we observe some regional imbalances with 31% of the establishments located in the Lis-
bon area. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 characterizes our sample of newly created establishments.
Less than 25 years 17.0%
Age [25; 34[ 35.2%
[34; 54] 41.6%
More than 54 years 6.2%
Female 54.7%
Less than 12 months 40.7%
Tenure [12; 36] 22.0%
More than 36 months 37.3%
Less than 9 years 33.3%
Education 9 years of schooling 25.3%
T h e 1% m is s in g 12 years of schooling 29.5%
a r e ig n o r e d . More than 12 years 10.8%
Level 1 - Top executives 6.8%
Level 2 - Intermediary executives 4.6%
Level 3 - Supervisors, team leaders, foremen 4.8%
Hierarchical Level 4 - High-skilled professionals 7.7%
level Level 5 - Skilled professionals 41.2%
T h e 3% m is s in g Level 6 - Semi-skilled professionals 13.9%
a r e ig n o r e d . Level 7 - Non-skilled professionals 9.4%
Level 8 - Apprentices, interns, trainees 8.6%
Table 2.7: Workforce composition (by establishment): 2003-2005
We move on to analyze the establishments personnel in terms of its origin in the
internal or external labor markets. Looking at Table 2.9, for the new establishments in
our sample and for the all period 2003-2005, we observe that, on average, around 40%
of the workers are hired in the external labor market: 15% come from another rm
while 25% are not present in the dataset in the year before the opening. We also nd
8% of uncertain origin hires.
We observe that more than half of the workforce of our new establishments is re-
cruited in the parent rm. This proportion may seem surprisingly high but is better
understood if we look at the proportion of internal transfers from establishments that
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A - Agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and forestry 1.4%
B - Fishing 0.04%
C - Mining and quarrying 0.3%
D - Manufacturing 6.5%
E - Electricity, gas and water supply 0.5%
F - Construction 7.4%
G - Wholesale and retail trade 40.0%
CAE H - Hotels and restaurants 7.5%
I - Transport, storage and communication 6.0%
J - Financial activities 10.1%
K - Real estate, renting and business activities 11.1%
L - Public adm., community, social and personal serv. -
M - Education 0.9%
N - Health and social work 4.1%
O - Other community, social and personal service act. 4.2%
P - Families with household employee -
Q - International inst. and other extra-territorial org. -
Norte 27.0%
Centro 21.3%
Lisboa 30.7%
Region Alentejo 8.2%
Algarve 6.0%
Madeira 3.2%
Açores 3.4%
Foreign 0.2%
Table 2.8: Characterizing establishments: 2003-2005
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remain open (Internal: Type I). For Type I internal transfers, the proportion drops
to 29% leading us to conclude that several openings may be linked to a closure or a
relocation of one (or more) previously existing units. Nevertheless, depending on the
year, we observe that between one fourth and one third of the workforce are internally
hired from existing establishments that remain open and this supports the importance
of intra-rm hires in opening events.
Type of hiring 2003 2004 2005 2003/2005
Internal (total) 54.0% 55.3% 46.1% 51.8%
Internal: Type I 28.8% 33.1% 25.7% 29.2%
Internal: Type II 25.2% 22.2% 20.4% 22.6%
External: outside QP 22.8% 24.7% 28.7% 25.3%
External: other rm 13.0% 15.2% 16.3% 14.8%
Uncertain origin 10.2% 4.8% 8.9% 8.1%
Table 2.9: Type of hiring per year
As expected, the proportion of internal and external hires varies depending on the
hierarchical level and occupation. In Table 2.10 we analyze the type of hiring by hier-
archical level. We nd that internal hiring is more important for top and intermediary
executives as well as for supervisors while external hiring predominates for less skilled
professionals.
Our data also adds details on the workersoccupation. In Table 2.11 we analyze
the type of hiring for the nine major occupational categories according to the National
Classication of Occupations (NCO)36. Overall, external labor market hires seem to
prevail for occupations that require less skills and that are closer to the bottom of the
hierarchy. We observe that internal hiring becomes more important as we move up the
job ladder. The lower levels in the typical establishment are much more likely to hire
from the outside while the upper levels are much more likely to hire from within (Lazear
and Oyer, 2004). This is consistent with the existence of ports-of-entry jobs into the
establishment and highlights the role of rm-specic human capital as a determinant of
internal transfers. Nonetheless, we also observe that a nontrivial proportion of vacancies
36Equivalent to the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO). See Appendix C.
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at every level and occupation are lled by external hires suggesting that rms are much
more complex and dont follow a strict policy of hiring from outside exclusively into a
limited set of levels and from inside into others. For example, even at the two highest
hierarchical levels 16% to 19% of the jobs are lled externally which suggests that there
is some level of uidity.
Type of hiring Level1 Level2 Level3 Level4 Level5 Level6 Level7 Level8
Internal (total) 74.2% 61.1% 71.3% 59.2% 53.1% 50.3% 48.1% 31.9%
Internal: Type I 41.8% 34.5% 37.2% 33.9% 27.9% 27.6% 24.2% 16.6%
Internal: Type II 32.4% 26.6% 34.1% 25.3% 25.2% 22.7% 23.9% 15.3%
External: outside QP 9.1% 7.1% 10.0% 10.1% 21.3% 28.8% 29.5% 46.8%
External: other rm 9.4% 9.2% 11.5% 8.7% 14.6% 16.0% 15.2% 17.2%
Uncertain origin 7.3% 22.6% 7.2% 22.0% 11.0% 4.9% 7.2% 4.1%
Number of estab. 4238 4292 4467 4975 15519 6170 4710 3641
Table 2.10: Type of hiring by hierarchical level: 2003-2005
Type of hiring NCO1 NCO2 NCO3 NCO4 NCO5 NCO6 NCO7 NCO8 NCO9
Internal (total) 76.8% 68.3% 55.3% 55.6% 43.2% 53.3% 64.3% 64.8% 51.2%
Internal: Type I 42.9% 36.5% 29.3% 31.2% 23.4% 25.0% 30.3% 31.1% 25.7%
Internal: Type II 33.9% 31.8% 26.0% 24.4% 19.8% 28.3% 34.0% 33.7% 25.5%
External: outside QP 7.2% 15.4% 13.0% 18.5% 34.3% 22.0% 17.5% 15.9% 27.7%
External: other rm 8.2% 11.5% 11.9% 11.9% 18.0% 16.9% 12.5% 12.6% 15.2%
Uncertain origin 7.8% 4.8% 19.8% 14.0% 4.5% 7.8% 5.7% 6.7% 5.9%
Number of estab. 3500 2227 6574 9578 9654 355 3684 2216 4717
Table 2.11: Type of hiring by NCO: 2003-2005
In Tables 2.12 and 2.13 we analyze how internal hiring varies with the rm and the
establishmentssize. The proportion of internal hires from establishments that remain
open decreases with the new establishment size. Regarding rm size, we see that the
proportion of internal hires seems to be higher for establishments that are a¢ liated
with parent rms with less than 50 workers and to parent rms with more than 100
workers.
Finally, in Table 2.14 we analyze how internal hiring varies with the establishments
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Estab. Size No Estab Internal Hiring (%) Internal: Type I
<10 workers 20395 51.3% 29.6%
10<= workers< 50 3456 53.3% 27.2%
>= 50 workers 541 59.3% 27.1%
24392
Table 2.12: Type of hiring by size of the new establishment: 2003-2005
Firm Size No Estab Internal Hiring Internal: Type I
<10 workers 6494 54.9% 32.9%
10<= workers< 50 6932 51.2% 28.2%
50<= workers <100 2303 48.7% 23.0%
>= 100 workers 8663 50.8% 28.8%
24392
Table 2.13: Type of hiring by parent rm size: 2003-2005
sector of activity. Internal hiring prevails in cae B (shing), cae F (construction) and cae
I (transport, storage and communication) while internal hiring from establishments that
remain active (Type I transfers) prevail in cae I (transport, storage and communication),
in cae B (shing) and in cae E (electricity, gas and water supply).
2.2.3.2 The worker sample .
In the previous section we have been featuring the establishments in our sample and
their workforce. In Table 2.15 we move on to the characterization of the 199058 workers
in our sample, i.e. that work in the establishments created by multi-establishment
companies.
We notice that internally hired workers are older than average while individuals that
are hired in the external labor market, particularly those that were out of the dataset in
the previous year, are younger indicating that some of these individuals may be starting
their way in the labor market. Internal hires have a higher proportion of males while
external hires have a predominance of females. When compared to external hires we
nd that internally hired individuals have a slightly higher proportion of workers with
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CAE No Estab Internal Hiring Internal: Type I
A 333 57.1% 27.6%
B 10 79.2% 48.3%
C 69 66.1% 39.2%
D 1577 61.1% 35.8%
E 128 58.9% 40.4%
F 1814 73.9% 29.5%
G 9756 46.0% 25.7%
H 1830 40.8% 23.8%
I 1469 73.4% 59.3%
J 2473 45.7% 25.7%
K 2696 45.6% 25.0%
L 0 - -
M 213 60.1% 33.5%
N 1001 63.3% 36.3%
O 1023 56.5% 27.0%
P/Q 0 - -
24392
Table 2.14: Type of hiring by economic activity: 2003-2005
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Internal External Uncertain
All Total Type I Type II Out QP Other rm origin
Number of workers 199058 111506 52275 59231 42552 25512 19488
Less than 25 years 16.2% 9.3% 8.1% 10.4% 36.4% 20.5% 5.6%
Age [25; 34[ 33.8% 32.6% 32.9% 32.2% 34.8% 40.2% 30.8%
[34; 54] 43.8% 50.2% 51.2% 49.3% 26.4% 36.1% 55.4%
More than 54 years 6.2% 8.0% 7.8% 8.1% 2.5% 3.2% 8.2%
Female 46.3% 41.4% 42.0% 40.9% 55.8% 50.5% 48.4%
Less than 12 months 35.1% 2.6% 2.8% 2.4% 98.2% 98.8% -
Tenure [12; 36] 19.6% 31.0% 29.3% 32.5% 1.8% 1.2% 16.9%
More than 36 months 45.3% 66.4% 67.9% 65.1% - - 83.1%
Less than 9 years 37.1% 40.6% 37.5% 43.4% 32.2% 36.3% 28.8%
Education 9 years of schooling 23.7% 21.8% 22.9% 20.9% 28.3% 27.2% 19.6%
12 years of schooling 26.9% 25.1% 26.5% 23.8% 29.7% 26.3% 31.7%
More than 12 years 11.5% 11.9% 12.8% 11.1% 8.4% 8.8% 19.8%
Top executives 5.3% 6.9% 7.9% 6.1% 1.8% 3.4% 5.9%
Intermed. executives 4.3% 5.3% 6% 4.7% 1.4% 2.7% 7.3%
Supervisors 4.6% 6.2% 5.9% 6.4% 2% 3.7% 3.0%
Hierarchical High-skilled prof. 8.0% 9.1% 10.9% 7.4% 2.9% 4.3% 17.9%
level Skilled prof. 35.6% 37.2% 34.4% 39.7% 29.1% 34.9% 41.6%
Semi-skilled prof. 15.1% 15.9% 19.9% 12.2% 16.2% 15.4% 7.9%
Non-skilled prof. 15.9% 13.2% 9.0% 16.9% 22.9% 18.4% 12.4%
Apprentices 4.9% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 11.5% 7.0% 2.3%
Table 2.15: Workerscharacteristics by type of hire: 2003-2005
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tertiary education37. We also observe a lower proportion of top and middle managers
in the group of externally hired individuals and a higher proportion of top hierarchical
levels in the group of internal workers. Non-skilled professionals and apprentices are
predominant in the group of externally hired workers.
2.2.3.3 Establishments survival statistics .
Finally, Table 2.16 reports some survival statistics. We observe that 22% of the
newly created establishments closed down after one year, allowing us to conclude that
we have a relatively high closure rate in the rst year after the opening. In the next two
years, the closure rate drops. As we can see in the Kaplan-Meier survival plot depicted
in Figure 2.3, three years after the opening 44% of the new establishments have closed
down.

New Estab. 2003/2005 24392 -
Open after 1 year 18965 5427
Open after 2 years 15942 3023
Open after 3 year 13626 2316
Table 2.16: Establishments survival statistics
2.3 Empirical Methodology: Duration Models, unobserved heterogeneity
and frailty models
In order to analyze new plants survival we dene a duration variable that measures
time elapsed since opening. The new establishments in our sample are followed until
closure or for three years after the opening hence, right censoring exists and must be
accommodated38. We estimate duration models with time-invariant covariates as we
are particularly interested in analyzing how the plants initial recruitment strategies
a¤ect the new units survival or hazard. We observe, however, that several plants in
our sample are a¢ liated with the same parent rm as one rm may open several new
37 In this item, uncertain origin hires stand out because of the considerably higher proportion of more educated workers
when compared with the other groups of individuals. We observe that more than one half of these workers have 12 or
more years of schooling. This is consistent with a stronger bargain power of these workers allowing them to secure tenure.
38Left censoring is not present.
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Figure 2.3: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate.
units within the observed period (2003-2005). In table 2.17 we see that, within the
observed period 7479 rms open only one establishment but 3419 rms open more then
one new unit.
Number of new estab. opened Number of rms
1 7479
2 to 9 3174
10 to 19 143
20 to 49 78
More than 50 24
Table 2.17: Parent rm characterization by number of establishments opend, 2003-2005
Establishments a¢ liated with the same rm share a common family background
and it is reasonable to believe that units a¢ liated with di¤erent rms face di¤erent
risks of closure. Indeed, the new establishments a¢ liated with one parent rm may be
more (or less) prone to failure than others. Some of these common characteristics can
be directly accounted for in our duration model while others may be unobservable or
unmeasurable. In this framework we have to account for unobserved heterogeneity as
some plants may be more "frail" and more prone to closure than others. We estimate
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a frailty model introducing in the duration model a random parameter into the hazard
rate that accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity. These models may account for
frailties that are individual-specic or, as in our case, frailties that are group-specic
because the observations within a subgroup share unmeasured risk factors that may
prompt them to exit earlier than other subgroups. The shared frailty models assume
that similar observations share a frailty that causes observations within the same group
to be correlated even though frailty may vary from group to group. Not taking into
account unobserved heterogeneity in duration models is particularly serious as it exac-
erbates negative duration dependence. This happens because, over time, as the frail
units fail, the sample becomes populated by more and more robust individuals. As a
consequence, the population hazards decline over time regardless of the shape of haz-
ards that individuals face (Lancaster, 1990). We follow by describing individual and
shared frailty models.
A. Individual Frailty Models
A useful concept in statistical analysis of a duration phenomenon is the hazard
function, that allows us to approximate the probability of closing within a short interval,
conditional on having survived up to the starting time of the interval:
h(t) = limt!0
P (tT<t+tjTt)
t
= f(t)
1 F (t) =
f(t)
S(t)
where f(t) is the probability density function, F (t) is the distribution function and
S(t) is the survival function. Another useful function is the integrated hazard function:
(t) =
R t
0
h(u)du
which relates to the survival function simply by
S(t) = exp

  R t
0
h(u)

= exp ( (t)) :
An especially important class of models with time-invariant regressors is the propor-
tional hazard model that can be written as:
hj(t) = h0(t)e
Xj
Now, suppose we have a sample of j observations where some units are more prone
than others to fail due to unobserved heterogeneity. If we have unobserved frailties, the
hazard rate will be a function not only of the covariates but also of the frailties:
hj(t) = h0(t)e
(Xj+Wj )
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where Wj is a frailty term drawn from a probability distribution with a mean of 0
and a variance of 1. If  = 0 the standard proportional hazard model is obtained. Also,
if we could measure/observe and directly include Wj in our model, then  would again
go to 0. We can rewrite the hazard in the following form:
hj(t) = h0(t)je
Xj where j = eWj .
The hazard rate is now conditional on both the covariates, X, and the frailty term,
. For identication purposes, we assume that the mean of  is 1 and that the variance
is unknown and equal to the parameter .
If the hazard is a function of the frailties, then the survival function is also conditional
on both the covariates and the frailty term. Thus, as the survival function S(t) =
exp [ (t)] we have the conditional survival function (Lancaster, 1990) as:
S(t;X; ) = exp

  R t
0
h(uj)du

= exp

  R t
0
h(u)du

To derive the expected value of the survival function, we need to specify g(v); a
probability distribution for 39. With the adoption of a distribution g(v), the expected
survival function can be derived from the hazard rate as follows:
S(t) = E [S(t;X; )]
= E
h
exp

  R t
0
h(u)du
i
= L
h
exp
R t
0
h(u)du
i
where L is the Laplace transformation. This function is commonly referred to as the
marginal survival function. Once the frailty is integrated out, accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity is reduced to estimating , the variance of the frailty term. This is the
marginal survival function because it is the observed survival function after  has been
integrated out.
For empirical purposes, we will consider a Weibull frailty model, so the conditional
survival function is:
S(tj) = e (t)
Additionally, we will assume a gamma distribution for g(). With gamma frailty,
the marginal Weibull survival function is:
39The gamma distribution is the most commonly used in the literature.
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S(t) = [1 + (t)] 
1

and the hazard rate is now:
h(t) = t 1 [S(t)]
Note that, when the variance of the frailty  is 0, the model reduces to the standard
Weibull model.
B. Shared Frailty Models
The main di¤erence between shared and unshared frailty models is the assumption
of how the frailty is distributed in the data as the frailty is now group-specic.
Suppose we have j observations (new establishments) and i subgroups (parent rms).
The hazard rate for the jth individual in the ith subgroup is:
hij(t) = h0(t)e
Xij+Wi 
where Wi is the subgroup frailty that the j units share. The frailty is assumed to be
independently distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. Again, if  = 0 or if
we could directly observe and include Wi, the standard proportional hazards model is
obtained. The hazard can be rewritten as:
hij(t) = h0(t)ie
Xij
where i = eWi . The only di¤erence with the individual frailty models is that frailty
is now shared among the j establishments of the ith parent rm. To estimate the shared
frailty model we just need to proceed exactly as in the case of individual heterogeneity
making the assumptions about g().
2.4 Estimation Results
We begin by describing the set of included covariates in the regression analysis. All
the duration models estimated include both rm-specic variables and establishment-
specic variables. The former include the parent rms growth, employment, number of
plants and age and are included to control for the e¤ect of observed characteristics that
are shared by the newly created establishments a¢ liated with the same parent rm.
The latter are the establishments size and workforce structure (age, education, gender
and hierarchical level). Most relevant for this study, we also control for the new units
recruitment policies, controlling for the proportion of internal hires in the workforce.
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Additionally, we also include a control for the proportion of workers that are shared
by the new establishment and other establishments of the same parent rm. All the
estimated regressions include a set of time, industry and region dummies.
Estimation results are shown in Table 2.18. The variables of interest to this study
are included in the latter subset of regressors. In the rst column we report a standard
Weibull duration model that controls only for observed individual and shared hetero-
geneity. In the second column we report results for a shared frailty model that also
controls for unobserved heterogeneity shared between new units that are a¢ liated with
the same parent rm, considering a gamma distribution for the shared frailty40. In
the third column we also report a shared frailty model but, in this specication, we
add a control for the proportion of internal transfers at the plants top hierarchical
level. Note that, in this third specication, we include a control for the proportion of
internal hires at the plants highest hierarchical level and not the proportion of hires
for "top executives", the highest hierarchical level in the data. This choice stems from
the observation that most of these new units are small branches of the parent rm that
often dont have top managers in their personnel. However, even in these small units,
transfer of rm-specic knowledge from the parent rm will be necessary and it is rea-
sonable to believe that this task is mainly carried out by the most skilled workers at
the plants highest hierarchical level. Therefore, to capture the importance of top level
workers but also to account for the establishmentspersonnel structure, we identied
the highest hierarchical level present in each new establishment and included a control
for the proportion of internal hires at this highest level.
Looking at the rst specication, that disregards unobserved heterogeneity, we see
that the Weibull hazard function exhibits a positive duration dependence as the esti-
mated  parameter is greater than 1, meaning that the new plants hazard of failure
increases over time. However, as discussed in the previous section, if unobserved frailty
exists this estimate is likely to be biased downwards as the frailty always pushes down
the duration dependence. Indeed, looking at the shared frailty model, reported in the
second column of the Table, we can observe an increase in the parameter .
To check for the appropriateness of introducing shared frailty in our models we
40Considering an inverse-Gaussian distribution for the shared frailty we obtained similar results.
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Duration Shared Frailty(1) Shared Frailty(2)
Variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Dummy for exogenous rm growth -0.1612*** (-6.78) -0.0732** (-2.08) -0.0735** (-2.08)
Firm size: log total employment -0.0558*** (-7.69) -0.0771*** (-4.49) -0.0768*** (-4.48)
Pre-multi 0.0565** (2.34) -0.0373 (-0.91) -0.0362 (-0.88)
Firm age (years) -0.0001 (-0.70) 0.0002 (0.83) 0.0002 (0.84)
Plant size: log total employment -0.1989*** (-17.89) -0.2691*** (-18.28) -0.2658*** (-18.00)
Workersage: 25 to 34 (% of total) 0.0979** (2.44 ) 0.0879* (1.66) 0.0863 (1.63)
Workersage: 34 to 54 (% of total) 0.0906** (2.24) 0.0966* (1.76) 0.0951* (1.73)
Workersage: + 54 (% of total) 0.0302 (0.48) 0.1441* (1.68) 0.1403 (1.64)
Workersedu.: 6 or 9 years (% of tot.) -0.0396 (-1.20) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0021 (0.05)
Workersedu.: 12 years (% of total) -0.1310*** (-3.82) -0.0700 (-1.42) -0.0688 (-1.40)
Workersedu: + 12 years (% of total) -0.1200** (-2.19) -0.0512 (-0.67) -0.0486 (-0.63)
Female (% of total) -0.1137*** (-4.33) -0.0638 (-1.62) -0.0642 (-1.63)
Shared workers (% of total) 0.4922*** (3.02) 0.6066** (2.41) 0.6103** (2.43)
Internal: Type I (% of total) -0.2749*** (-9.03) -0.2415*** (-5.74) -0.0442 (-0.54)
Internal: Type II (% of total) 0.0161 (0.52) -0.1777*** (-4.22) -0.1839*** (-4.36)
Uncertain Origin (% of total) -0.4417*** (-7.46) -0.0809 (-0.93) -0.0877 (-1.01)
Internal (I) highest level (% tot. at level) -0.1958*** (-2.78)
Constant -2.4401*** (-21.47) -2.3307*** (-13.22) -2.3268*** (-13.09)
N 24392 24392 24392
 1.3224 1.8223 1.8224
 1.9678 1.9657
Log likelihood -24695.18 -22467.90 -22463.98
Prob>X2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Specications include time, industry and region dummies and controls for workers hierarchical level
***, **, * denotes statistically signicant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
Table 2.18: Duration model and shared frailty model: 2003-2008
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analyze the results from the likelihood ratio test of H0 :  = 0. The result of the test
indicates a statistically signicant level of unobserved heterogeneity since the obtained
p-value is virtually zero.
With frailty models we can distinguish between the hazard rates that individuals face
and the population hazard. In a standard proportional hazard model, these hazards
are the same since all individuals are assumed to be identical. However, in a hetero-
geneous population, with group-shared frailty the population hazard can fall while the
individual hazards rise because, over time, as the frail members close down, the popula-
tion becomes crowded by more and more robust individuals. This frailty e¤ect assures
that population hazards may decline over time regardless of the shape of hazards that
individuals face. Considering our gamma shared frailty model reported in the second
column of Table 2.18, Figure 2.4 shows the population (or unconditional) hazard while
the mean individual (or conditional) hazard is shown in Figure 2.5. Indeed, we observe
that the population hazard does decline after the second year whereas the individual
hazard continues to climb.
Figure 2.4: Unconditional hazard
In order to discuss the relevance of rm-specic human capital to the new units
success we need to assess how the rms recruitment strategy in the internal versus
external labor market a¤ects survival. Considering the model in the second column
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Figure 2.5: Individual hazard
of Table 2.18, that already takes into account the unobserved frailties that are shared
by new establishments a¢ liated with the same parent rm, we observe that a higher
proportion of total internal hires, compared to external hires, decreases the probability
of failing. This positive impact on the new establishments survival is obtained for
both types of internal hires, whether they come from establishments that remain in
operation (Type I) whether they come from establishments that are closing (Type II).
This evidence supports our hypothesis that embodied rm-specic human capital plays
an important role in improving the survival of newly created establishments. However,
not all employees will be equally important to this process. To get a more detailed
outlook on how this channel for knowledge transfer works, in the specication reported
in column three of Table 2.18 we add a control for the proportion of internal hires at
the new establishments top hierarchical level. Adding this control, we observe that the
proportion of internal transfers at the highest hierarchical level has a positive impact
on the new units survival but we also note that the total proportion of Type I internal
hires loses its statistical signicance (although the sign remains negative). We may
conclude that skilled workers at high-rank jobs are crucial for the transmission of rm-
specic human capital to the new unit whereas low skilled, undi¤erentiated workers
will not play an important role in the knowledge transfer process. In the new plant,
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skilled workers will be responsible for the di¤usion and implementation of rm-specic
human capital that will positively a¤ect the new establishments survival. Some authors
have pointed out that it is human capital rather than physical capital that provides the
basis for sustained competitive advantage (Youndt et al., 1996). Successful rms are
those that develop rm-specic assets which cannot be imitated by competitors and
that provide the basis for their competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney 1991).
Other authors, such as Teece (1998), have argued that one of the few classes of assets
that are not tradeable today are knowledge assets, which puts the ultimate source of
competitive advantage of a rm in its employees. For newly created establishments,
this is particularly true for those employees that are central to the knowledge transfer
process or, in other words, for skilled workers. Internal transfers are, probably, one
of the most important channels to share and transfer this "unique" assets to the new
plant. We conclude that, although knowledge is tacit and hard to codify, it is embodied
in the organizations routines and processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Co¤, 1997 and
Teece, 1998) and can be successfully transferred from the parent rm to the new unit
embodied in the group of employees that are internally transferred. Moreover, the
positive impact on the rms survival brought by the higher proportion of internally
hired top level workers can be strengthened by the fact that workers internally hired to
higher-rank jobs are more likely to have won on the basis of their ability rather than
as a result of the handicap given by the employer (Chan, 1996).
Looking at the shared frailty models we also observe that new plants a¢ liated with
growing rms are less likely to close down41. New establishments a¢ liated with large
rms also tend to be less prone to failure. Therefore, we may conclude that being linked
to a large growing parent rm apparently increase the robustness of the new unit and
provides a favorable environment for the new establishment. The parent rmsage and
being a multi-establishment rm before the opening of the new unit doesnt appear to
have a statistically signicant impact on the new units closure probability. Moving on
to analyzing the impact on failure of the new plantscharacteristics, we conclude that
41To avoid endogeneity problems related to the impact on the rms growth due to the opening of the new unit, our
growth dummy controls for the increase in the total number of workers employed by the rm not including the new
units employees.
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larger establishments are less likely do close down. Previous studies on rm duration
have concluded that the probability of failure is negatively related to rm size (Mata
and Portugal, 1994). Larger units should be able to survive longer because, when facing
negative outcomes, they have the option to shrink before they exit. On the other hand,
larger entry size may signal greater a priori expectations of success and more periods
with bad results will be needed to eliminate the ex ante positive expectations (Frank,
1988). Larger units may also take longer to fail as small units tend to be more exible
and respond more easily to market uctuations (Mills and Schumann,1985). Looking
at the composition of the new plants personnel we observe that plants with a high
proportion of younger workers tend to fail less. Furthermore, new establishments with
a higher proportion of more educated workers and with a higher proportion of skilled
workers (i.e., workers in managerial and technical occupations) seem to have a lower
probability of failing, although some of the regressors are not statistically signicant42.
We also conclude that the presence of a higher proportion of employees that the new
plant has to share with other establishments of the parent rm increases the new units
risk of failure.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we examined the survival of new plants a¢ liated with pre-established
rms. Entrants from pre-established rms deserve special and separated attention as
the determinants of survival may di¤er. A central issue in entries by pre-established
rms is that the parent rm can supply expertise in management and operational
knowledge which may aid the new plant developing a successful entry strategy. Our
work develops the study of the channels by which the parent rm or other units in the
same group transfer expertise to the newly opened branch by suggesting a direct channel
for knowledge transfer that has not been addressed in previous literature: the internal
transfer of employees from existing units to the new establishment. Our hypothesis is
that within-rm and across establishments mobility plays a central role in the transfer
of rm-specic knowledge and, therefore, positively a¤ects survival.
42Previous works have concluded that the larger the initial stock of human capital in the rm, the lower the likelihood
that the rm will exit (Geroski et al., 2010).
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We observed that internal hires are an important way to ll the new vacancies created
by the opening. On average, more than one half of the workers in the new plant were
hired from other establishments of the same rm. Although some of these employees
were transferred from establishments that were closing down, we also found that the
proportion of internal hires that were transferred from establishments that remain in
operation was still high, reaching 30%, and this proportion increases to around 40% for
the highest hierarchical levels and skilled workers. Among the reasons that can explain
the option for internal hires, we believe that, for new entrants, the need to transfer
rm-specic human capital to the new unit is a key argument. Indeed, we observed
that almost 70% of the internally hired workers had more than 36 months of tenure
at the rm. The specic knowledge argument is also particularly pertinent for skilled
workers and we observed that internal hires prevail at higher levels and for skilled
professionals. Overall, external labor market hires seemed to prevail for occupations
that were closer to the bottom of the hierarchy giving some support for the existence
of ports of entry. Nevertheless, we also observed that rms recruitment strategies are
complex and external hires may be observed virtually at all levels and, even for the two
highest hierarchical levels, 16% to 19% of the jobs were lled externally.
Duration models were used to analyze the impact of internal hiring on survival.
Given that new plants a¢ liated with the same parent rm share the same family back-
ground and as it is reasonable to believe that units a¢ liated with di¤erent rms face
di¤erent risks of closure we included shared frailty in our models. The obtained results
strongly supported the presence of shared unobserved heterogeneity that a¤ects the
new plants survival.
We observed that the proportion of internal hires has a positive impact on survival.
The obtained results led us to conclude that internal transfers are, probably, one of the
most important channels to transfer rm-specic knowledge to the new establishments.
This non-tradable unique asset may create an important competitive advantage for new
units a¢ liated with pre-established rms. We also concluded that not all employees are
equally important to this knowledge transfer. Low skilled workers are not at the centre
of strategic decisions and, therefore, are not critical for a successful expertise transfer.
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The transfer of rm-specic expertise is carried out by the skilled workers that are in-
ternally hired to the new establishments high-rank jobs. Finally, the improved survival
of establishments with a higher proportion of skilled internal hires also supports the
premise that at higher levels, hires are based on the candidatessuperior ability. Our
main conclusion is that rm-specic knowledge, that is an important source of com-
petitive advantage and that can improve the new plants survival, can be successfully
transferred from the parent rm to the new unit embodied in the group of employees
that are internally transferred.
Finally, bearing in mind our nding that a signicant proportion of vacancies in the
new plant are lled by employees transferred from other establishments of the same rm
that remain open, we believe that promising future research in this eld could focus
on what happens at the origin when these workers are transferred to the new plant.
Namely, it would be relevant to assess how the establishment of origin replaces or copes
with the exit when an employee is transferred to a new establishment.
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Appendix A
Hierarchical levels dened by law (Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, de 2 Junho):
 Level 1 - Top executives (top management)
 Level 2 - Intermediary executives (middle management)
 Level 3 - Supervisors, team leaders, foremen
 Level 4 - Higher-skilled professionals
 Level 5 - Skilled professionals
 Level 6 - Semi-skilled professionals
 Level 7 - Non-skilled professionals
 Level 8 - Apprentices, interns, trainees
Appendix B
CAE - Portuguese Classication of Economic Activities (equivalent to
SIC codes):
 cae A - Agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting and forestry
 cae B - Fishing
 cae C - Mining and quarrying
 cae D - Manufacturing
 cae E - Electricity, gas and water supply
 cae F - Construction
 cae G - Wholesale and retail trade
 cae H - Hotels and restaurants
 cae I - Transport, storage and communication
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 cae J - Financial activities
 cae K - Real estate, renting and business activities
 cae L - Public Administration, Community, Social and Personal Services43
 cae M - Education
 cae N - Health and social work
 cae O - Other community, social and personal service activities
 cae P - Families with household employee
 cae Q - International Institutions and other extra-territorial organizations
Appendix C
National Classication of Occupations (NCO), equivalent to the Interna-
tional Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO):
 NCO 1 - Executive civil servants, industrial directors and executives
 NCO 2 - Professionals and scientists
 NCO 3 - Middle management and technicians
 NCO 4 - Administrative and related workers
 NCO 5 - Service and sales workers
 NCO 6 - Farmers and skilled agricultural and sheries workers
 NCO 7 - Skilled workers, craftsmen and similar
 NCO 8 - Machine operators and assembly workers
 NCO 9 - Unskilled workers
43Establishments belonging to CAE L were droped as this sector is out of the main scope of our analysis (this
establishments represented less than 1% of the inital group).
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